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ABSTRACT 
The Cold War’s end was sudden, unpredicted and the seminal event of the latter 
half of the twentieth century.  Since the disintegration of the USSR, debate has centered 
on whom or what was responsible for the end of the conflict.  Perhaps no issue is as 
controversial as the role the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) played in ending the 
Cold War.   
Today, there are three main schools of thought concerning SDI’s impact on the 
end of the Cold War.  The first sees the Strategic Defense Initiative as a primary factor in 
ending the conflict. Another argues the initiative extended the Cold War by creating one 
more hurdle to the negotiations between the two superpowers.  A third school holds that 
while SDI had a positive impact on ending the Cold War, it was a secondary factor.  The 
third school’s position is best supported by the available evidence. 
 
“Ninety-nine percent of the Russian people believe that you won the Cold War 
because of your president’s insistence on SDI.”2 
—  Genrikh Trofimenko, one of Russia’s leading specialists in international 
security and politics 
                                                 
2 Andrew Busch, Ronald Reagan and the Politics of Freedom (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2001),  214.  
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I. THE ROLE OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE IN 
ENDING THE COLD WAR 
The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative’s role in ending the Cold War is the subject 
of a strenuous debate involving three main schools of thought. The first sees the Strategic 
Defense Initiative as a primary factor in ending the conflict.  Another argues the initiative 
extended the Cold War by creating one more hurdle to the negotiations between the two 
superpowers. A third school holds that while SDI had a positive impact on ending the 
Cold War, it was a secondary factor.   
All of the arguments stem from several key questions. The central issue concerns the 
question, What drove Gorbachev’s decision to exit the Cold War? This thesis rephrases that 
question more narrowly: What were the primary influences that motivated Gorbachev to sign 
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, (INF Treaty) — 
which arguably ended the conflict  — and to what degree were they instrumental in its 
signing? Additional questions that will be addressed include the following: Did either the 
Soviet Union’s investment in developing countermeasures to the U.S. defense initiative or its 
own ballistic missile defense (BMD) system severely strain the Soviet economy? Did Soviet 
fear of losing a new arms race in light of their economic and technological backwardness, as 
compared to the West, push them to negotiate? Were there other factors that would have 
driven Gorbachev to exit the Cold War regardless of the Strategic Defense Initiative? 
In the early and mid 1990s, many texts were written to explain why the Cold War 
ended the way it did.3  Since then, however, memoirs, formerly classified documents, and 
additional critical analyses have since been published that support some of the earlier 
arguments but degrade others. In light of this new evidence, the Strategic Defense Initiative 
debate merits revisiting for two reasons. First, to coalesce the existing arguments with the 
information that is now available. This is worth doing for the historical value alone.  
                                                 
3 For example, Peter Schweizer’s Victory, considered the standard bearer for the argument that Reagan 
won the Cold War, was published in 1994.  Raymond Garthoff’s The Great Transition also published in 
1994 credits Gorbachev with ending the conflict.  The same year, in The Soviet Tragedy, Martin Malia 
argued the U.S. arms build up triggered Perestroika. 
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Second, the SDI affair may prove useful for understanding the debate surrounding 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) today.  This thesis examines the different points of view 
regarding the Strategic Defense Initiative’s impact on the end of the Cold War and finds 
the evidence best supports the thesis that SDI was a secondary factor in ending the 
conflict. 
The difference between the pro-SDI school and thesis that SDI was a secondary 
factor is one of degree but vital.  In order for the pro-SDI school to be correct, the defense 
initiative would have to have been the primary factor behind Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
decision to exit the Cold War.  Instead, the evidence supports the counterfactual position 
that had the Strategic Defense Initiative never existed, Gorbachev would most likely have 
still pursued an end to the Cold War.  This position also partially supports the anti-SDI 
school thesis that SDI prolonged the Cold War by creating a barrier in negotiations.  
However, SDI did of course exist and it presented Gorbachev with a strong incentive to 
negotiate an end to the Cold War in addition to other reasons such as a growing economic 
crisis, domestic politics, as well as non-SDI related actions taken by NATO and the 
United States.  This thesis does not identify one primary trigger for the end of the Cold 
War but finds these other influences strong enough to discount the argument that the 
Strategic Defense Initiative was the driving force behind Gorbachev’s decision to sign the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty and exit the Cold War.   
To examine the evidence, this thesis is organized into six sections.  Chapter II is 
divided into two parts.  Part one argues that the signing of the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces treaty marked the end of the Cold War.  Part two reviews literature 
pertinent to the three schools of thought. 
Chapter III discusses Reagan’s foreign policy approach. It begins with a 
description of the status quo in 1981 when Reagan took office and then describes 
Reagan’s rejection of the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and his vision 
for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).   
Chapters IV through VI focus on Soviet reactions to the defense initiative over 
three time periods.  Within each of the three phases, the Soviet response is described in 
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relation to two groups of actors. The general secretary had the most power in shaping 
Soviet decision making. But a second group comprised of the national security 
community, including the defense industry, the KGB, the military, and the scientific 
community, also influenced the decision-making process.   
The positions of these powerful secondary authority sources within the Soviet 
system are significant for two reasons.  First, understanding the positions of these other 
actors sheds light on probable reasons for the decisions of the general secretaries.  
Second, the military and scientific groups held divergent views on SDI.  Thus, it is useful 
to analyze each group’s possible influence on the general secretary separately.  
Chapter IV begins with the announcement of SDI in March 1983 and concludes in 
March 1985 with the death of General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko.  This period was 
the initial response to SDI, which began under the leadership of General Secretary Yuri 
Andropov.  Under Andropov and Chernenko, arms control policy was dominated by the 
Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko and the Defense Minister, Dimitri Ustinov, and later 
Ustinov’s successor Sokolov.4  They were all geriatric members of the World War II 
generation and the passing of Andropov and Chernenko opened the door to the next 
generation of Soviet bureaucrats. 
Chapter V begins with the selection of Mikhail S. Gorbachev, a “new” type of 
Soviet leader in March 1985.  It concludes with the stalemate over the Strategic Defense 
Initiative at the Reykjavik Summit in October 1986. Chapter VI describes Gorbachev’s 
decision to de-link SDI from the INF treaty and concludes with the signing of the treaty 
at the Washington Summit in December 1987.  The final chapter assesses the role of SDI 
in the end of the Cold War as a secondary factor that helped end the conflict.  
                                                 
4 V. M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 276. 
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II. THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND SCHOOLS OF 
THOUGHT ON SDI 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Cold War was rooted in an ideological struggle between communism and 
totalitarianism, represented by the Soviet Union, and capitalism and liberty, represented 
primarily by the United States. The most dangerous feature of the struggle was the 
nuclear stand-off which threatened both countries and much of the world with 
annihilation. The signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty effectively 
ended the stand-off and marked the end of the Cold War. It signified the abandonment of 
international class struggle, a tenet of communist ideology, and provided the framework 
for the first verifiable reduction in nuclear weapons.   
The role the Strategic Defense Initiative played in ending the Cold War is 
represented by three schools of thought.  The first argues that SDI was a primary factor in 
winning the Cold War.  The second holds that SDI and Reagan’s policies hindered 
negotiations and therefore prolonged the conflict.  The third school contends that SDI 
was a positive but secondary factor in ending the Cold War.  
B. THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
The end of the Cold War is often defined as one of the landslide of events that 
took place in 1989 such as the Polish elections or the tearing down of the Berlin wall.  Or 
it is associated with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991.5   
However, the former events are better described as the end of the Soviet empire and the 
latter as the end of the Soviet regime.  Gorbachev’s 1988 speech to the United Nations 
announcing a dramatic unilateral reduction in forces in Europe is also sometimes cited as 
the end of the Cold War.  But this, while significant, was in reality icing on the cake of 
                                                 
5 See: Norman Friedman, The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War (Annapolis, Md.: 
Naval Institute Press, 2000),  xi., John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2005),  257- 259. 
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the Washington Summit in December in 1987.  There, with the signing of the INF treaty, 
the Cold War effectively ended.   The treaty was the conclusion of the Cold War for three 
reasons.   
First, the INF treaty essentially ended the U.S. - Soviet nuclear arms rivalry.6  It 
was the end of the military competition which had helped define the Cold War.  For the 
first time both sides agreed to decrease the size of their nuclear arsenals, pledging to 
eliminate an entire class of missile.  In addition, it was the first time the Soviets allowed 
for intrusive verifications.  The Soviets agreed that Western experts could monitor and 
verify the removal and destruction of their intermediate range missiles.7 Thus the treaty 
marked a momentous change in U.S.–Soviet arms control, which had focused previously 
on capping levels of strategic weapons and did not include transparent verification.8    
Second, by signing the INF Treaty Gorbachev formally abandoned the Marxist-
Leninist idea of class struggle.9  No longer was nuclear war officially “thinkable.”10 It is 
true that words to this effect had been said earlier.  For example, in 1982 the Soviet 
defense minister, Dimitri Ustinov, stated publicly that the USSR, “does not count on 
achieving victory in a nuclear war.”11 And even earlier, Khrushchev had revived the 
concept of peaceful coexistence to justify avoiding nuclear war with the West.12  The 
Soviets defined the term in 1960 as:  
… a specific form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism.  
The socialist system is victorious in worldwide competition with 
                                                 
6 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in 
Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 18-19. 
7 Matthew Evangelista, Turning Points in Arms Control, ed. Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned 
Lebow, Ending the Cold War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 83. 
8 Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold 
War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 327. 
9 Martin E. Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: NY: 
Free Press, 1994), p. 416.  Also see: Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p. 85. Chernyaev describes Gorbachev’s Reykjavik proposal as 
the rejection of class struggle.  But until the proposal was codified in the INF Treaty there was no real 
commitment, however sincere the intentions.  
10 Malia, The Soviet Tragedy, p. 416. 
11 Zubok, The Soviet Union in the Cold War,  272. 
12 Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 222. 
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capitalism because the socialist mode of production has a decisive 
advantage over the capitalist mode of production.  There is no 
contradiction between the Marxist-Leninist position concerning the 
inevitability of communism and peaceful coexistence.  It does not affect 
the internal relations of states and it does not affect the revolutionary 
struggle for the reconstruction of societies.  Peaceful coexistence of the 
states of the two systems does not presuppose a compromise on 
ideological questions. It is impossible to reconcile the bourgeoisie and 
communist world outlooks and indeed this is not required for the peaceful 
coexistence of states.13 
For Lenin, Khrushchev, and all Soviet leaders until Gorbachev, however, peaceful 
coexistence was a tactical pause in the strategic ideological class struggle between 
communism and capitalism.  Gorbachev changed the dynamic.  At the 27th Congress of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), he ensured that the phrase “a specific 
form of class struggle” was removed from the definition of “peaceful coexistence.”14 
Moreover, war was no longer viewed as inevitable.15 Instead, in 1986 Gorbachev stated 
that “the backbone of the new way of thinking is the recognition of the priority of human 
values.”16 Gorbachev’s departure in words from class struggle in favor of universal 
values was finalized in deed with the INF treaty. It marked the actual abandonment of the 
idea that confrontation with the capitalist countries was required and inevitable.     
Finally, by the end of 1987, the genies of perestroika and glasnost had been 
released and were undermining the regime. Gorbachev’s 1998 speech to the United 
Nations signaled a major reduction of conventional forces in Europe, but this was a 
conventional arms repeat of the historic decision to rid Europe of intermediate nuclear 
missiles.  Decisions still remained to be made about how the final curtain would fall on 
the Soviet Union, but in hindsight the INF treaty was the end of the external 
confrontational phase of the Cold War.    
                                                 
13 David Rees, Peaceful Coexistence: A Study in Soviet Doctrine (Washington: International Security 
Council, 1989), 40. Italics added. 
14 Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World, 1st ed. 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 147. 
15 Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, The Challenges of Our Time: Disarmament and Social Progress 
(New York: International Publishers, 1986), 201. 
16 Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World,  146. 
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C. THREE SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ON SDI’S ROLE IN ENDING THE 
COLD WAR 
1. Pro-SDI Arguments 
The first school credits SDI as a primary trigger in the end of the Cold.17  There 
are two lines of thought which fall under this argument.   
One holds that the Soviets invested large amounts of time and resources to 
develop some sort of counter to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative in the form of a 
Soviet strategic defense.  But by the time of the Reykjavik Summit in the fall of 1986 
they decided it was futile to try to match U.S. efforts.18 The only reasonable option left 
for Soviet policy makers was to negotiate with the West.  The negotiations which 
resumed in 1985 at Geneva and culminated in the INF Treaty in December 1987 
comprised a virtual surrender by the Soviets to the threat of the SDI and signaled their 
exit from the Cold War.19    
The second version of this argument does not contend the Soviet Union devoted a 
large amount of wherewithal to counter the Strategic Defense Initiative.  Instead, Soviet 
policy makers, especially Gorbachev, believed they could not afford to engage in a new 
space arms race.  SDI highlighted the economic and technical backwardness of the USSR 
and was therefore, “a principle factor in triggering perestroika.”20   
According to this school, SDI and the dramatic increase in U.S. defense spending 
during the early 1980s was a critical concern to Soviet leaders. Gorbachev’s perception 
that the Soviets did not have the resources to compete with the Americans in space was a 
primary factor for his entering into arms control negotiations with the United States.  The 
general secretary wanted a reprieve from the expensive and increasingly unstable Cold 
                                                 
17 Mira Duric, The Strategic Defence Initiative: US policy and the Soviet Union (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2003),  53. 
18 Thomas C. Reed, At the Abyss: An Insider's History of the Cold War, 1st ed. (New York: Ballantine 
Books, 2004), 256. 
19 Malia, The Soviet Tragedy, 414. 
20 Ibid. 
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War so he could focus on revitalizing the USSR’s domestic economy.21  The Reykjavik 
summit in October 1986 failed because the two leaders could not agree on SDI.22  
Reagan offered to share SDI technology, if it was developed, with the Soviet Union.  But 
Gorbachev wanted the strategic defense research confined solely to the laboratory and, 
anyway, did not believe the United States would share SDI technology.23  Nonetheless, 
by December 1987 Gorbachev desperately wanted out of the Cold War.  By that time, 
perestroika had greatly increased domestic instability and he felt he no longer had the 
time to negotiate over arms reductions.  This is why he signed the INF Treaty in 
December without gaining any concessions from the United States on SDI.24 In July 
1991, just before the collapse of the Soviet Union but well after Gorbachev’s 1987 exit 
from the Cold War, former President Reagan promoted the following thesis. 
We knew, however, that the Soviets were spending such a large percentage of 
their national wealth on armaments that they were bankrupting their 
economy. We also knew that, if we showed the political resolve to develop 
SDI, the Soviets would have to face the awful truth: they did not have the 
resources to continue building a huge offensive arsenal and a defensive one 
simultaneously.  At the same time, in 1983, the West German government 
decided to proceed with deployment of cruise missiles, checkmating Soviet 
forces facing NATO in Europe.  Soviet negotiators in Geneva walked out and 
did not return until March, 1985, coinciding with Mikhail S. Gorbachev's 
succession to leadership.  A realist, Gorbachev had no illusions about the 
desperate condition of his country's economy.  At our first summit meeting in 
Geneva that November, he and I agreed to a goal of 50% reductions in 
nuclear weapons on both sides. He argued strenuously, as he did at 
subsequent summits, for a delay in the development, testing and deployment 
of SDI.  But that was one element on which we could not afford to budge, and 
I did not.  As we now know, Gorbachev concluded that the only practical 
thing was to embark on basic reforms at home, and without delay. Today, we 
see a Soviet Union undergoing fundamental change, politically and 
economically.25 
                                                 
21 Malia, The Soviet Tragedy, 414. 
22 Jack F. Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended, 1st ed. (New York: Random 
House, 2004),  228. 
23 Ibid., 222. 
24 Malia, The Soviet Tragedy,  416. 
25 Ronald Reagan, "It Was `Star Wars' Muscle That Wrestled Arms Race to a Halt " Los Angeles 
Times July 31, 1991. 
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In short, SDI heightened Gorbachev’s perceived need for reforming the Soviet 
Union by presenting his country with a threat they could not match unless the economy 
was overhauled.  First, they were technologically too backward.  Second their economy 
was already too much in favor of guns over butter; to increase the burden on the 
population anymore could be catastrophic for the regime.  Reagan’s intransigence over 
SDI at Geneva and Reykjavik constrained Gorbachev’s ability to move forward with 
perestroika and brought him to the point where he was willing to unilaterally withdraw 
from the Cold War.   
2. Anti-SDI Arguments 
The second school of thought contends that SDI had little impact on the end of the 
Cold War. If anything, it extended the conflict by creating another hurdle to 
negotiations.26 Proponents of this line of reasoning hold that SDI did not cause the 
Soviets to agree to return to strategic arms-control talks in November 1984 and that, at 
Geneva and Reykjavik, SDI was an obstacle to negotiations. But not because the 
Strategic Defense Initiative was in itself a primary concern to Gorbachev.27 The Soviets 
were not worried about the potential threat SDI posed to the Soviet economy.  Nor were 
they overly concerned with the USSR’s technological ability to develop countermeasures 
to SDI. As Pavel Podvig points out, recently discovered Soviet documents suggest that 
the scientific community did not invest in developing an expensive Soviet SDI.28  
Instead, legacy programs were bundled together, which did not require a significant 
increase in costs.29  
The Strategic Defense Initiative complicated negotiations between the 
superpowers because Gorbachev and his advisors felt discussions on offensive weapons 
reductions could not move forward without an agreement first on a reduction in defensive 
                                                 
26 Pavel Podvig, "Did Star Wars Win the Cold War?  Soviet Response to the SDI Program,"  (March 
2007),  19. 
27 Ibid., 5. 
28 Ibid., 8-11. 
29 Ibid., 20. 
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weapons.30 This concern arose out of Soviet domestic politics. Gorbachev viewed the 
defense industry as a powerful actor he needed to check in order to consolidate his own 
position and carry through perestroika and glasnost. Within the Soviet Union there was 
strong debate over arms negotiations and SDI. The Soviet political leaders, led by 
Gorbachev and supported by similar concerns from the scientific community, sought to 
limit SDI testing to the laboratory as a means of countering the Soviet defense industry as 
much as out of concern of SDI itself.31 The defense industry and military used SDI as an 
opportunity to demand a greater role in Soviet decision making and more spending for 
defense.32 Containing SDI then was a way for Gorbachev to outflank his own defense 
industry.   
A corollary to this argument is that Soviet motivations in the arms negotiations 
are irrelevant because the negotiations had no impact on perestroika. Indeed, Roald 
Sagdeev, the former head of the Soviet Space Research Institute, claims that SDI had 
“absolute zero influence” on Soviet reforms.33 The internal conflict between various 
Soviet actors was driven in part by the Soviet defense burden but not at all in reaction to 
SDI or any specific Western defense policy.34 This is best summed up by Celeste 
Wallander: “There is no evidence that drastic cuts in defense based on negotiated arms 
control or disarmament agreements were a necessary condition for Gorbachev’s 
economic reforms.”35 Perestroika was not dependent on Western policies; it was solely a 
reaction to internal economic issues. Thus, the Strategic Defense Initiative’s impact on 
the Soviet economy was minimal and only hindered arms negotiations and, by extension, 
the end of the Cold War.   
                                                 
30 Podvig, “Did Star Wars Win the Cold War?,” 5.   
31 Ibid., 20. 
32 Malia, The Soviet Tragedy,  414. 
33 Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement To End the Cold War 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 242. 
34 Celeste Wallander, "Western Policy and the Demise of the Soviet Union," Journal of Cold War 
Studies 5, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 147. 
35 Ibid.: 155. 
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3. SDI as a Secondary Factor 
The third school argues that SDI was a secondary factor in ending the Cold War, 
as one of many exogenous factors in the 1980s that accelerated the internal decay of the 
Soviet system. This theory is supported by some former Soviet experts such as Vladimir 
Lukin, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Foreign Relations Committee in the 1980’s who 
said of SDI and the 1980’s U.S. defense effort in general, "You accelerated our 
catastrophe by about five years."36 According to this argument, SDI exploited the 
technology gap between the West and Soviets and presented a potential threat to the 
Soviet economy.  It also helped convince Soviet leaders to return to negotiations with the 
West.   
President Reagan’s “Star Wars” speech in March 1983 heightened Soviet fears.  
The speech reinforced Soviet beliefs that the American president was dangerous and as 
Andropov said, “unpredictable.” 37 SDI helped destabilize the relationship between the 
superpowers and increased tensions.  The level of Soviet unease with American 
intentions was demonstrated in the fall of 1983 when a Korean airliner that had wandered 
off course into Soviet airspace was shot down.   
The relative backwardness of Soviet technology fed into Soviet apprehensions.  
As Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, noted, the Soviet 
leadership worried initially “that the great technological potential of the United States had 
scored again and treated Reagan’s statement as a real threat.”38 But by 1986, Gorbachev 
recognized that SDI was not an imminent danger.39 Still, at least one Soviet scientist, 
Roald Sagdeev, believed that “Americans oversold SDI” and “Russians overbought it.”40 
                                                 
36 Robert McFarlane, "Consider What Star Wars Accomplished," The New York Times, August 24, 
1993. 
37 Gaddis, The Cold War, 228. 
38 Ibid., 227. 
39 Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, 57. 
40 Brown, The Gorbachev Factor,  226. 
 13
Gorbachev was worried that while SDI might not be plausible, technological offshoots 
that resulted from strategic defense research could become a threat to Soviet security.41   
Rather than a deterrent to negotiation or a primary factor, the defense initiative 
was one more reason for Gorbachev to begin talks with the West.42  To maintain his 
focus on domestic reform, Gorbachev first needed to reduce tensions with the West and 
the associated costs of competing with it.  If he did not, the defense industry might use 
SDI as an excuse to dramatically increase spending which could then overwhelm the 
economy.43 The failed talks at Geneva and Reykjavik constrained Gorbachev’s efforts at 
reform communism.  Domestically, he needed to demonstrate progress with the United 
States in order to quell the conservative voices in the defense industry. But, he also felt 
that if drawn into a new arms race, “We [the USSR] will lose, because right now we are 
already at the end of our tether.”44 After Reykjavik, Gorbachev concluded that Soviet 
foreign relations were inextricably tied to the domestic reforms which conservatives at 
home were becoming increasingly resistant to.45  By the time of the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty in December 1987, Gorbachev was ready to postpone his 
objections to SDI, to exit the Cold War, and to focus on managing internal reforms and 
calming the growing instability in the empire.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Defining the INF Treaty as the end of the Cold War allows us to better examine what 
factors played a role in ending the conflict.  This paper focuses on the role SDI played in the 
signing of the INF treaty and by extension, in the end of the Cold War.  The historical 
analysis done to date can be divided into the three schools outlined above.  The first contends 
SDI was a key driving factor in bringing an end to the Cold War.  The second, anti-SDI 
school holds that the defense initiative extended and complicated the conflict.  The third 
schools put forth a thesis that SDI was a strong secondary factor in ending the conflict.   
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III. PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE 
INITIATIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
For Ronald Reagan, the Strategic Defense Initiative primarily offered the promise 
of making nuclear weapons obsolete.   However, it also fit into his administration’s long-
term plan to pressure the Soviet Union on multiple fronts and bring them into serious 
negotiations on everything from arms reductions to human rights.  The evidence then 
supports the argument that SDI was a secondary factor in ending the Cold War in the 
sense that it was one of many strong polices put forth by the Reagan administration to 
challenge the USSR 
Ronald Reagan’s approach to U.S.–Soviet relations was a departure from the 
conventional status quo that began with President Eisenhower’s belief in “massive 
retaliation” and later formalized during the Kennedy administration into the doctrine of 
mutually assured destruction (MAD).  It was the reasoning behind MAD that led to the 
U.S. decision to push for the ABM Treaty in 1972, which became part of the West’s 
embrace of détente.  Through détente the West hoped to increase transparency and 
communication between the superpowers, to reduce tensions, and to moderate Soviet 
behavior.  The Soviets agreed to a dialogue to reduce tensions, but they also wanted the 
time, money, and technology to gain superiority over the West.46  Détente began to fall 
apart with the Soviet deployment of SS-20s in Eastern Europe in 1977 and the invasion 
of Afghanistan in 1979.47   
The collapse of détente was completed when Reagan actively challenged the 
Soviet Union.  SDI was part of Reagan’s “peace through strength” effort to leverage the 
United States’ comparative advantages.  His administration wanted to use technology, 
economic might, and the moral high ground to shape Soviet decision-making.  But SDI 
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also reflected Reagan’s position as a nuclear abolitionist. He famously described MAD 
“like two cowboys in a frontier saloon aiming their guns at each other’s head – 
permanently.”48 Reagan rejected the logic of MAD and turned instead toward protecting 
the United States and its allies through a focus on defense against nuclear weapons with 
the ultimate aim of ridding the world of nuclear arms and their threat of total annihilation.     
By 1984, Reagan had come to believe that the Soviets were so unnerved by U.S. 
policies that they had almost gone to war over NATO’s “Able Archer” exercise in 
November 1983.  In part because of this, the president began to more aggresively seek a 
dialogue with Soviet leaders so as to mitigate the chance of misunderstandings.   
B. THE STATUS QUO 
The parameters of the Cold War were established in the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations.  At first, President Eisenhower believed that nuclear weapons could be 
used like a “bullet,” but he soon moved away from this position.49 Eisenhower feared any 
strategy that allowed for a limited nuclear war would, in reality, quickly spiral out of 
control into total war.50 Instead, he favored massive retaliation, believing that it was best 
to have and to communicate to the world the idea that the United States would counter 
direct Soviet aggression with massive nuclear strikes.51 Eisenhower believed that this 
strategy would deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons in Europe and elsewhere. During the 
Kennedy administration, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara developed 
Eisenhower’s concept into the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), a 
doctrine that required the maintenance of a delicate balance.52 For it to work, each side 
had to believe it could absorb a horrendous nuclear barrage and still be able to launch a 
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retaliatory strike.  Stability came from the knowledge that a nuclear exchange would 
result in the obliteration of not only the enemy but also one’s own country.53  
However, according to the logic of MAD, missile defenses would disrupt the 
fragile equilibrium.  Theoretically, the deployment of an effective defense system 
encouraged the notion that it was “safe” to launch a first strike, because the enemy’s 
retaliatory strike could be adequately deflected.  However, a state that lacked a ballistic-
missile defense (BMD) system might also have an incentive to launch a preemptive first 
strike. Its objective would be to attack before the other side’s defense system became 
operational. At a minimum, the deployment of missile defense systems could ignite an 
arms race as the side without an adequate defense might try to regain the equilibrium by 
increasing the size of its arsenal to improve the probability of penetrating its adversary’s 
missile defenses.54 
1. Détente 
MAD was codified in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.  The ABM 
Treaty allowed for only limited defense against ballistic missiles; the US and USSR 
agreed to protect only one site each.  In conjunction with the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Treaty I (SALT I), also signed in 1972 in which the superpowers agreed to limit 
deployment of ICBMs, SSBNs, and SLBM launchers, the ABM Treaty ushered in a 
period of détente.55  At the time President Nixon remarked, “Although every instinct 
motivates me to provide the American people with complete protection against a major 
nuclear attack, it is not now in our power to do so.”56  
The treaties reflected the belief in the West that nuclear war was not “winnable.” 
The goal instead became stability. Echoing West Germany’s Ostpolitik under Willy 
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Brandt, the United States embraced a strategy aimed at decreasing tensions with the 
Soviets through dialogue, trade, and investment.57 Henry Kissinger hoped that, “over 
time, trade and investment may leaven the autarchic tendencies of the Soviet system and 
by gradual association of the Soviet economy with the world economy, foster a degree of 
interdependence that adds an element of stability to the political equation.”58    
The strategy was exemplified in the Helsinki Final Act, signed in 1975, and split 
into three “baskets.”  Basket I of the act addressed security.  It granted the stability of 
current borders under “international law,” and the rights of states to form or end 
alliances.59  Basket II promoted trade and investment between East and West.  Basket III 
recognized the “universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”60 
The West believed that in exchange for favorable trade and accepting the legitimacy of 
Soviet territory the USSR would moderate its behavior internationally and domestically.   
Détente did bring strategic stability.61 Conflict was confined to conventional 
proxy wars in the Third World, and even there the United States gave way after its 
experience in Vietnam. The West also continued to accept the human rights abuses of 
communism, as well as those of right-wing dictatorships that fought communists over the 
risk of direct confrontation.  Stability, whatever the moral compromises required, was 
better than holocaust.   
General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev saw the ABM treaty as a pause in the long-
term competition against capitalism.  Arms control in general not only minimized the risk 
of nuclear war but also gave the USSR time to catch up with the West in weapons and 
technology.62  In addition, at the time of the ABM Treaty, Soviet scientists believed it 
was not feasible to deploy an effective BMD system with the current technology. They 
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had already tried to implement an anti-missile shield for Moscow, but the system was not 
promising.63 The ABM Treaty served to hold the Soviet anti-ballistic missile system 
gains while essentially stopping U.S. missile defense research.64 As a hedge, Soviet 
negotiators ensured that, should new technology “‘based on other physical principles’ 
than those employed in current systems” be developed, it would not be banned by the 
treaty.65     
The Soviets welcomed détente. In addition to strategic stability, the talks partially 
fulfilled the West’s goal of increased understanding.  Through much of the 1960s the 
Soviet leadership did not fully understand or accept U.S. concepts of strategic stability or 
deterrence.66  But dialogue during SALT I improved Soviet comprehension of the U.S. 
position that nuclear war was not winnable and must be avoided.  In the Soviet Union, 
this stance was supported by many scientists and senior military officers.67 However, the 
Soviet leadership still believed nuclear war was winnable.  And thus, adherence to Soviet 
ideology meant that the strategic doctrine, the bundles of assorted documents and 
pronouncements that as a whole defined Soviet nuclear strategic thinking, demanded 
nuclear war be winnable.68 While the United States negotiated from a position that held 
the avoidance of nuclear war as the primary goal, the Soviets strove to be ready to win a 
nuclear war.  Fritz Ermarth, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council,   
argued this logic had perverse consequences.  As the USSR increased its number of 
nuclear weapons, the United States became more and more convinced that nuclear war 
must be avoided. Meanwhile, some in the USSR viewed their growing strategic 
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advantage as an assurance that nuclear war was possible.69 That is, they believed they 
had the capability to completely destroy the West, and were willing to accept a relatively 
weak second strike in return. 
Brezhnev also viewed the combination of détente and arms control as a tipping 
point in the class struggle against capitalism.70 The United States had lost the Vietnam 
War and curtailed its efforts to actively counter communism in the Third World. And the 
worldwide recession, abandonment of the Bretton Woods international monetary system, 
and Watergate political crisis in the United States appeared to Soviet policymakers as the 
beginning of the end of capitalism and part of a “correlation of forces” tilting in favor of 
communism.  At the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress in 1976, Brezhnev outlined these ideas 
in an address to the assembly, noting, “It is precisely during the past [five] years that the 
capitalist world has experienced an economic crisis, the seriousness and depth of which 
… can only be compared with the crisis at the beginning of the 1930s.” He then went on 
to allude to Watergate as yet another signal of a bourgeoisie crisis.71 The general 
secretary concluded, “there is no future for capitalist society.”72 
This so-called correlation of forces also favored the Soviets because the West was 
providing them with financial and technological transfers which helped support the 
declining economies of their satellites states. After the Arab oil embargo of 1973, the 
Soviet economy benefited, in addition, from an influx of petrodollars, a massive inflow of 
money that infused some life into the weakened command economy.73   
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2. Unintended Consequences 
Though the Soviets felt they had gotten the best of détente unintended 
consequences left the empire in a weakened state by 1981.  The government overspent on 
defense and did not appreciate the human rights virus spreading throughout the empire.   
Theoretically, arms control might have been a way for the Soviets to control 
defense spending, but they chose a dramatic increase instead.  Moreover, because defense 
was the only economic sector that grew, the weight of it weakened the overall economy.  
Eventually, only the high prices of the raw materials and energy that the Soviets exported 
made their position tenable.74  
The Helsinki Final Act in 1975 defined international human rights norms as 
“standards of governance that impose positive and negative obligations on states and 
groups to ensure the basic security, freedom, and dignity of groups within their 
jurisdiction.”75 Principles VI, VII, and VIII, respectively, called for the “nonintervention 
of the internal affairs of other participating states regardless of their mutual relations;” 
“respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, 
conscience, religion, or belief;” and “respect [for] the equal rights of peoples and their 
right to self-determination.”76 Brezhnev signed the agreement, but had no intention of 
upholding human rights norms within the empire.  He signed in exchange for technology 
and financial transfers and for the international legitimacy of the Soviet Union’s World 
War II gains.77 In any case, the same rights were already guaranteed to Soviet citizens by 
their constitution and several treaties, none of which had affected the regime’s conduct 
toward its people.78 The Helsinki Agreement, however, reverberated across the USSR in 
unanticipated ways.  Human rights groups began to form within the communist countries, 
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demanding the rights set forth in the Helsinki Act’s Basket III. The Catholic Church and 
NGO’s assisted citizens within the Eastern bloc countries to form, fund, and support 
internal resistance organizations. In addition, people behind the Iron Curtain were less 
isolated. Their access to the Western press increased, undermining the empire’s 
monopoly on information.79 But eventually, the communist governments began to crack 
down on dissidents, encouraged in part by the willingness of the West to tolerate what 
were clearly violations of the Helsinki agreement.  Nonetheless, the strain on the system 
continued to grow.80   
In the late 1970s, détente began to unravel.  First, in 1977, the Soviets deployed 
newly developed SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Eastern Europe. From the 
Soviet perspective, the SS-20 was an uncontroversial upgrade of the old SS-4 and SS-5 
missiles.81 It was more accurate and had a longer range, and each missile had three 
independent warheads.82 The West perceived their deployment as an attempt to break up 
NATO, fearing that European countries would doubt U.S. credibility in the event of an 
attack on Europe.83 “Would America risk its cities and launch an attack if Europe were 
struck?” If the states’ answer was no, they might then abandon NATO and seek separate 
deals with the Soviets.84 In part to curtail the chances of such an event, in 1979 NATO 
launched a “dual track” response to the SS-20s.  It prepared to deploy two new U.S. 
missile systems, while at the same time engaging in negotiations to find a different 
solution.  If, by the fall of 1983, no agreement had been reached, 464 ground-launched 
cruise missiles (GLCMs) and 108 Pershing II missiles would be deployed in Europe.85  
Second, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, after the pro-
communist government there had been overthrown. Soviet decision makers saw 
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Afghanistan as an ideological battle ground much like Hungary in 1956.86 It was part of 
the “Brezhnev Doctrine,” the Soviets declared the right to intervene in neighboring 
countries should their socialist governments be threatened.87  To many in the West, the 
invasion was perceived as part of a Soviet plan to expand into the Middle East. And the 
Soviet support of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua only added to the U.S. fears of a new 
Soviet push into the Third World. In addition, throughout the 1970s, the Soviets 
continued to significantly increase the size of their conventional forces.88 All these 
factors played a role in President Carter’s decision in 1979 to increase defense spending 
and in 1980 to abandon his efforts to persuade the senate to ratify SALT II.89 In addition, 
in 1980 the president declared the “Carter Doctrine;” any outside attack on the Persian 
Gulf states would be repelled by the United States.90  
C. REAGAN’S FOREIGN POLICY PLAN 
When Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, the question facing the West was 
how to deal with a perceived resurgence of Soviet aggression, detente was in tatters. 
Between 1981 and 1983 the administration instigated a thorough rejection of the status 
quo.  Reagan refused to accept the Soviet Union as a legitimate actor in the international 
system. In contrast to Eisenhower, who argued that “the communist objective is to make 
us spend ourselves into bankruptcy,”91 Reagan asked, “why can’t we just lean on the 
Soviets until they go broke?”92 In Reagan’s view, the Soviet regime was losing its 
ideological appeal both internally and externally. He also believed that the Soviets were 
plagued with a faltering economy, a claim supported by CIA estimates.93  They projected 
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that, by the end of the 1980s, Soviet defense spending could rise from about 13.5 percent 
of GNP to 20 percent; and that the expected expenditures would increase discontent 
among the population as it was squeezed even more to support defense.94 The Reagan 
administration believed, therefore, that if the Soviets were pressured and challenged on 
multiple fronts, they could be forced to make concessions at the negotiating table.   
In an October 1983 speech, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam broadly 
outlined the administration’s strategy, that the West should “strive to create an 
environment in which the Soviet Union is faced with…drastically reduced opportunities 
for adventurism and intimidation.” This would push the Soviets, he argued, to “see 
restraint on their part as the most attractive option.”95  
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 75, distributed in January 1983, 
broadly laid out a three-pronged plan to employ positive and negative incentives to 
“shape” Soviet decision-making.  Point one was to counter Soviet expansionism, which 
became the Reagan Doctrine, and would in time include operations in Angola, 
Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and other Third World states to “roll back” Soviet efforts of 
global influence. 
A corollary to this approach was to demonstrate that the use of force would no 
longer be tolerated to suppress dissidents.  Thus, during the 1981 Solidarity movement in 
Poland, to persuade the Soviets that the use of Soviet troops was unacceptable, the 
administration initiated psychological warfare operations (PSYOPS).96 These were only 
known at the highest levels of the United States government and of course by the Soviets.   
In the summer of 1981, a combined allied fleet of eighty-three ships transited the 
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Greenland/Iceland/United Kingdom Gap undetected and conducted operations near 
Soviet territory.97  And though the Polish crisis subsided in December 1981, the 
operations continued. In 1983, the Pacific Fleet conducted a three-carrier battle group 
exercise near Petropavlovsk, the Soviet’s only open-sea naval base.98  It was the largest-
ever exercise in that area.99 According to Dr. William Schneider, former undersecretary 
of state for military assistance and technology, the Soviets “did not know what it all 
meant. A squadron would fly straight at Soviet airspace, and other radars would light up 
and units would go on alert.  Then at the last minute the squadron would peel off and 
return home.”100   
Point two of NSDD 75 was to encourage the Soviets to undertake major internal 
policy changes toward a market-based economy and political liberty.  Support for human 
rights reforms became a key piece of this effort.  In the 1970s, the Soviets, especially the 
satellite states in Europe, took large Western loans, and high inflation had dramatically 
increased the cost of their debt.101 Reagan wanted to compound the problem. For 
example, according to Peter Schweizer, the United States went after the Soviet’s 
petrodollar revenue, with the CIA playing a key role in three areas.  They helped 
sabotage Soviet efforts to build a pipeline to Western Europe; convinced the Saudi 
government to lower the price of oil, which boosted the U.S. economy while damaging 
the Soviets’; and stopped critical technology transfers to the Soviet Union, including 
equipment necessary to maintain their oil fields.102 Finally, the Security Directive called 
for bilateral relations.  Summits, like trade, were linked to other points of contention in 
the American–Soviet relationship, a line of thinking that was to play a part in the 
stalemate at Reykjavik when Reagan brought Soviet human-rights abuses into the 
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discussions.  Lastly, summits did not need to end with written agreements, but would be 
premised on overall improvements in Soviet conduct.103 This was another departure from 
previous presidents who had not linked Soviet behavior to arms control agreements.104 
1. Early Talks 
During the first two years of the Reagan administration, arms control seemed a 
low priority.  In 1981, for example, Secretary of State Alexander Haig stated that “Arms 
control is no longer the centerpiece of U.S.–Soviet relations.”105 Nonetheless, the Reagan 
administration was reaching out.  On November 30, 1981, negotiations over intermediate 
nuclear forces resumed, but  were predicated on Reagan’s “zero option” proposal, which 
had been announced on the 18th.  Under the “zero option,” the United States would not 
deploy either Pershing II or ground-based cruise missiles in Europe.  In exchange, the 
Soviet Union would have to agree to remove all of its SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles 
deployed within range of Europe.106 Reagan’s offer did not address the Soviets’ concern 
about French and British nuclear forces and was viewed by critics as a way to forestall 
productive agreements.    
In 1981, Reagan also proposed replacing SALT II with Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks (START).  Critics of the plan argued that, like the “zero option,” this U.S. position 
was decidedly one-sided.  It called for a nuclear parity where the U.S. would maintain 
much of its level of land nuclear forces but that required the Soviets to destroy over half 
their land-based nuclear weapons.107  
In 1982, the lead American negotiator, Paul Nitze, tried to break the stalemate 
over intermediate nuclear forces by proposing that each side have a total of seventy-five 
intermediate launchers in Europe, and that the United States would deploy only cruise 
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missiles.108 The latter was a concession to the Soviets who feared, incorrectly, that the 
longer-range Pershing IIs based in Germany could strike Moscow.109 It was entirely 
Nitze’s idea and had not been cleared with Washington.  The Soviet negotiator, Yuli 
Kvitsinsky, agreed to take the potential framework to Moscow, where the idea died, in 
part because the Soviet leaders did not want to undermine the nuclear freeze movement 
and the anti-missile communists in Europe.110   
Early in his administration President Reagan tried to engage in meaningful 
dialogue.  In April 1981, the president wrote a personal letter to General Secretary 
Brezhnev that was accompanied in the end by a stiffer letter from the State Department, 
which did not want to give too soft an impression to the Soviets.111 In his letter, Reagan 
described the common human values that were sometimes hindered by state 
governments.  Reagan’s attempt at personal dialogue fell flat; Brezhnev’s response was 
impersonal and interpreted by Reagan as an “icy reply.”112   
D. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AND REJECTION OF 
MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION 
The Strategic Defense Initiative became the most controversial of Reagan’s 
defense efforts.  In a televised speech on March 23, 1983, the president asked,  
What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security 
did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet 
attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles 
before they reached our own soil or that of our allies? 
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 Noting that this would involve risks, the president continued,  
I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise 
certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive systems, they 
can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that. 
But with these considerations firmly in mind, I call upon the scientific 
community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn 
their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us 
the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.113   
1. Roots of the Strategic Defense Initiative 
SDI was a rejection of mutually assured destruction.  It also reflected Reagan’s 
nuclear abolitionism which stemmed from the 1940’s. Then Reagan and many 
Americans, including President Truman and Edward Teller, a renowned physicist and 
member of the Manhattan project, for a time supported the "Baruch Plan" to turn nuclear 
weapons over to an international body.114  Reagan first became acquainted with the idea 
of missile defenses on November 22, 1967 when he was governor of California.  That 
day, he took a tour of the federal government’s nuclear research facility in Livermore, 
California at the behest of Edward Teller, a missile defense enthusiast, and received a 
detailed brief on current anti-missile technology.115  Reagan came away from the meeting 
believing that missile defenses might be possible, though apparently even then he was in 
favor of a non-nuclear defensive system.116 Then in 1979, when campaigning for 
president, Reagan and his policy aide Martin Anderson visited NORAD.  The tour of the 
facilities reinforced Reagan’s belief in the need for missile defenses and prompted an 
internal campaign memo to look into the feasibility of such systems.117  Once president, 
his administration began publicly talking about missile defenses in early 1981 after 
Reagan signed NSDD 12, one part of which stated a “vigorous research and development 
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program will be conducted on ballistic missile defense systems.”118 Later, in September 
1982, Edward Teller lobbied Reagan at the White House for support of a missile defense 
X-ray laser that would be powered by a nuclear explosion in space. The meeting was 
short, in Teller’s opinion he did not impress the president, and Reagan’s advisors were 
openly critical of Teller’s idea.119  Teller was surprised then, when Reagan announced 
SDI the following spring. 
But the defense initiative was not the result of any single epiphany; it was a 
product of Reagan’s long held nuclear abolitionist beliefs.  For Reagan, SDI was in part a 
return to the concept of international control of nuclear weapons and probably behind his 
offer to share SDI with the Soviets and the world.120  If a system could be developed that 
would adequately defend against nuclear weapons than perhaps no one would want them. 
On March 29, 1983 in a conference with reporters the president stated his vision:  
In my opinion, if a defensive weapon could be found and developed that 
would reduce the utility of these [ballistic missiles] or maybe even make 
them obsolete, then whenever that time came, a President of the United 
States would be able to say, ‘Now, we have both the deterrent, the missiles 
– as we’ve had in the past – but now this other thing has altered this.’ And 
he could follow any one of a number of courses…He could offer to give 
that same defensive weapon to them to prove that there was no longer any 
need for keeping these missiles.  Or with that defense, he could then say to 
them, ‘I am willing to do away with all my missiles.  You do away with 
yours.’121 
2. SDI as a Way to Shape Soviet Decision Making 
The Strategic Defense Initiative was also in keeping with NSDD 75 and played 
toward Reagan’s belief in the vulnerability of the Soviet economy.122 As he indicated in a 
June 1983 letter to a supporter, Reagan clearly saw SDI as a negative incentive for the 
Soviets to continue the arms race: “Hopefully a defense could result in real negotiations 
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leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.” Among other levers, Reagan wanted 
to use the initiative to persuade the Soviets to make concessions on arms reductions and 
change their nuclear posture. For instance, just after the Geneva summit in November 
1985, Reagan wrote, “If he [Gorbachev] really wants an arms control agreement, it will 
only be because he wants to reduce the burden of defense spending that is staggering the 
Soviet economy.  This could contribute to his opposition to our SDI.  He doesn’t want to 
face the cost of competing with us…any new move on our part, such as SDI, forces them 
to revamp, and readjust their plan at great cost.”123  In addition, he believed that a missile 
defense system could defend against minor nuclear powers.  Even a partially effective 
ballistic-missile defense, he argued, would be useful against "A Middle East madman, an 
Asian dictator, a slip-up, a trigger-happy general, or some limited type of missile 
strike."124   
Within the administration there were multiple views on SDI.  For example, 
National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, Secretary of State George Shultz, and lead 
negotiator Paul Nitze saw the defense initiative as a powerful bargaining chip to use in 
negotiations.125  Caspar Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense, did not want the United 
States to even discuss missile defense in negotiations.126 Chief of Naval Operations 
James Watkins shared Reagan’s belief that SDI should be explored and brought the Joints 
Chiefs of Staff aboard though they all thought the president’s March speech was 
premature.127  There was some general agreement that missile defense did not have to be 
impenetrable to work.  That is, it would be effective if a potential adversary believed 
enough of their missiles would be stopped such that their attack would fail.128  In short, 
two things are important to note.  First, no one within the administration completely 
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agreed with Reagan’s vision for missile defense.  Second, Reagan did not care. He was 
passionate about it because he believed it might eventually lead to the obsolescence of 
nuclear weapons and would not yield.129 
3. Understanding SDI 
So what was SDI?  Reagan had no set goal for what type of ballistic missile 
defense SDI would result in or even whether it would result in a feasible system.  In a fall 
1984 letter he stated, “Frankly, I have no idea what the nature of such a defense might be.  
I simply asked our scientists to explore the possibility of developing such a defense.”130  
His only qualifier was that he wanted a non-nuclear system.131 General ideas for the 
project were described in 1983 by the CIA:  
Ballistic missile defense systems could be on air, ground, and submarine 
platforms as well as on satellites; high energy lasers, particle beams, or 
microwave systems could become elements of a national ballistic missile 
defense (BMD) system along with improved conventional-technology 
systems.132  
Proponents of ballistic missile defense envisioned a multilayered approach. 
Depending on the phase of an incoming missile’s flight, different tiers of defenses could 
be used to try and knock it down.133  One benefit of this type of system was that no one 
layer had to be one hundred percent effective.  For example, a five-layer defense with 
each section having an 85 percent success rate would be able to stop all but one missile in 
a ten-thousand missile attack.134 The most famous and controversial aspect of SDI was 
research into space-based weapons. Edward Teller, inventor of the hydrogen bomb, 
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promoted the potential for a nuclear explosion–powered laser that would knock out 
Soviet ICBMs.  By late 1987, “brilliant pebbles,” a series of kinetic warheads, became 
the main research focus of a way to knock out ICBMs in space.135  What is important is 
that there was never a definite system, only research into various options.  In brief, the 
Strategic Defense Initiative was a long-term research and development project into 
ballistic missile defenses.   
E. A PUSH FOR DIALOGUE 
Throughout 1983 the Reagan administration held a relatively hard line against the 
Soviets. Within the administration, the hard-liners pushed to postpone a summit until the 
Soviets made some concessions.  Others, including most importantly the president, 
seemed willing to pursue a meeting with Andropov.136 But, in September 1983, the 
Soviets shot down Korean Airlines flight 700 (KAL 700) as it flew off course in Soviet 
airspace.  More than the act itself, the attempted Soviet cover-up temporarily dampened 
Reagan’s enthusiasm for engagement.137  Then, in November, Reagan came to believe 
that the Soviets had almost mobilized in response to a NATO “Able Archer” exercise. In 
truth, a KGB mole in London probably exaggerated the Soviet reaction when he reported 
the incident to British intelligence. Nonetheless, Reagan seemed to believe it.138 
Moreover, this came on top of the abandoned intermediate nuclear forces (INF) talks, 
military threats to Poland, the ongoing war in Afghanistan, support of terrorism, aid to 
Third World revolutionaries, and the KAL affair.139 Tensions were high and the 
administration decided to make a concerted effort for dialogue.  
On January 16, 1984, President Reagan spoke to the American people on the 
subject of U.S.–Soviet relations.  It was a call for dialogue. America, he said, was “in the 
strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship 
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with the Soviet Union.” The president laid out a three-part agenda that was 
complementary to National Security Decision Directives 75.  First, lower the risk of 
confrontation with a long-term goal of eliminating the use of force in international 
disputes.  Second, to increase trust and stability, reduce nuclear stockpiles. Third, 
increase understanding between the superpowers through dialogue, exchanges, and 
freedom of information regarding each other’s societies and respect for individual rights. 
Later because of its paramount importance, Secretary of State Shultz emphasized the 
human rights issue as a separate common interest.  These four linked areas became the 
framework for all the administration’s future summits with the USSR140 
In March, Reagan pushed for a summit with General Secretary Konstantin 
Chernenko.  The president’s letter stressed the need for a summit.  In strategic weapons 
he offered “trade offs,” to find common ground.  If the Soviets did not want to negotiate 
on strategic weapons, the president recommended talks to ban chemical weapons and 
developing improved communications between the superpowers.  But Chernenko was not 
receptive to the offer.141 
Soon, Reagan had reason to believe that the plan in NSDD 75 was working.  A 
June 1984 CIA memorandum outlined U.S. successes and possible Soviet reactions.  The 
American economy was strong and congress was debating, not the requested increase in 
defense spending per se, but only the size of the increase.  Meanwhile, the Soviet 
economy was in decline, the empire was in its “terminal phase.” In addition, the United 
States was succeeding in its efforts to stop the flow of financial and technological 
transfers to the Soviet bloc, and Soviet expansionism in the Third World was on the 
defensive. The CIA memorandum predicted three possible outcomes.  First, the Soviet 
Union could try to revive the economy either through drastic reform or by cutting defense 
spending.  Second, the Soviets could “blow it,” by mismanaging the empire’s decline.  A 
new type of society, democratic or authoritarian, might then emerge, but in the medium 
term it would probably be less of a threat than the Soviet Union to American interests.  
Third, the Soviets could embark on high-risk foreign policy gambits, such as a nuclear 
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first strike, in an attempt to regain their lost power.  Though the Soviets could be 
expected to bargain for Western loans and technology, the memo recommended that the 
United States only help if the Soviets engaged in reforms.  At the same time, however, 
America needed to ensure that the Soviets did not decide it was in their best interest to 
launch a first strike.142     
F. CONCLUSION 
The Strategic Defense Initiative was one of many levers the Reagan 
administration employed to try and shape Soviet decision making as outlined in NSDD 
75.  It fit into three key aspects of the administration’s policy toward the Soviet Union 
and supports the thesis that SDI was a secondary factor in the end of the Cold War.  First, 
SDI was part of an overall defense build-up to regain military strength, and second, it 
leveraged superior U.S. technology and economic power.  It was hoped SDI would help 
shape Soviet decisions by making negotiations the most attractive option out of the arms 
race.  In this sense, it was by design a secondary or contributing factor in the 
administration’s overall effort. 
The fall of 1983 marked the high point of U.S.–Soviet tensions in 1980s.  In the 
winter of 1984, Reagan announced that the United States was now strong enough to work 
with the Soviets. The president wanted to maintain pressure on the Soviets but at the 
same time more actively sought to decrease tensions through dialogue.  However, Reagan 
would have to wait until 1985, however, for a Soviet leader with whom he could 
“business together.”143  
The Strategic Defense Initiative also largely reflected Reagan’s nuclear 
abolitionism and was a rejection of the doctrine of mutually assured destruction and the 
policy of detente.  Reagan did not know whether a missile defense system was possible, 
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only that new technology might make it feasible. Unlike trade, for Reagan, SDI would 
never be a bargaining chip.  He believed not only that arms reduction was an excellent 
way to reduce the potential for nuclear war, but also that the best way to rid the world of 
nuclear weapons would be to make them obsolete.  This was his main attraction to 
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IV. INITIAL REACTIONS: MARCH 1983-MARCH 1985 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There was no clear overall Soviet response to the Strategic Defense Initiative 
during this period until early 1985.  While the Soviets were alarmed over SDI almost 
immediately after Reagan announced it, it was one of many issues they had to deal with 
relative to the West.  The old guard dominated the government’s initial response.  
Brezhnev had died in November 1982 so at the time of SDI’s unveiling in March, 1983 
the General Secretary was Yuri Andropov, who came from the same fold as previous 
Soviet leaders.  Andropov broke precedent, however, by being the first former head of 
the KGB to become general secretary, having chaired that most paranoid and anti-
Western of Soviet organizations from 1967 to 1982.  In Soviet circles, Andropov was 
seen as an innovative leader who could revitalize the Soviet system. This was mostly 
myth however. He was aware there were serious problems but offered only cosmetic 
changes such as anti-corruption campaigns as solutions.144 Perhaps his most important 
decision was naming Mikhail Gorbachev as his successor, though Konstantin Chernenko 
would eventually delay Gorbachev’s ascension.145 In foreign policy Andropov’s views 
reflected the KGB’s deep suspicion of capitalist provocation, and thus his reaction to SDI 
was severe.146  He believed that SDI, in addition to a host of other provocations, had 
brought the Soviet Union and the United States close to war.  But whatever direct impact 
Andropov’s ideas may have had was curtailed by his failing health.  After brief fifteen-
month tenure, in February 1984 he died from kidney failure.   
Following a short succession dispute with Gorbachev supporters, an infirm 
Konstantin Chernenko, who had chaired Politburo meetings in Andropov’s many 
absences, took over as general secretary.  Like Andropov, Chernenko was a product of 
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the Stalinist system. But he, too, would reign only for a short time, holding the job for 
just over twelve months before his death.  Foreign policy remained relatively stagnant 
during this period as, the first generation of Soviet leaders passed from the scene.    
B. GENERAL SECRETARY  
General Secretary Andropov took Reagan seriously.  In a Politburo meeting on 
May 31, 1983, he remarked, “if you look at the events that are taking place in the 
Western countries, you can say that an anti-Soviet coalition is being formed out there. Of 
course, that’s not accidental and it’s highly dangerous.”147 In keeping with his KGB 
roots, Andropov viewed Reagan with almost fanatical suspicion.148  The Soviet 
leadership’s and KGB’s fears can be traced to Hitler’s surprise attack, codenamed 
operation BARBAROSSA, on the USSR in June, 1941.149 The failure to predict 
BARBAROSSA was largely due to Stalin’s refusal to believe numerous reliable 
intelligence reports that indicated an attack was imminent.150 Stalin, however, 
successfully blamed Soviet intelligence.  The KGB probably derived from this experience 
a doctrine that it would never again allow the Soviet Union to be the victim of a surprise 
strike.  This view persisted throughout the Cold War and partially accounts for the deep 
distrust Soviet intelligence had of Western motives.151 By the late 1970’s the Soviet 
leadership saw the “correlation of forces,” moving against them as their economy 
declined relative to the West and they fell behind Western technology.152  By 1980, 
Andropov, believed the United States was determined to gain nuclear superiority.153   
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Then Reagan’s open push to increase U.S. strength exacerbated Andropov’s, not wholly 
rational, fear of another surprise attack.154  The announcement of SDI heightened 
Andropov’s alarm. 
Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, indicated that the 
Andropov led Politburo considered the Strategic Defense Initiative a “real threat.”155 
Andropov took three tacks with SDI.  First, they engaged in an all-out propaganda 
campaign, many of whose themes were the same as those used against NATO’s “dual 
track” to deploy intermediate missiles in Europe.156 The campaign included accusations 
that SDI would kick off a new arms race, make arms control negotiations impossible, 
violated existing arms control agreements, and signified a U.S. abandonment of Europe. 
To these allegations, Andropov added that SDI would militarize space, was not 
technically feasible, and was too expensive.157  In part, this was an effort to undermine 
U.S. domestic support for SDI as well as to drive an already wary Europe away from the 
president’s initiative.158 But it also reflected Andropov’s beliefs.  He thought that SDI 
signaled a new arms race in space, which he publicly pledged to match. 159 However, 
both Andropov and later Chernenko thought privately that the arms race was imperiling 
the Soviet economy and wanted to slow it down.160   
Andropov’s second response to SDI was an attempt to manage the arms race by 
pursuing negotiations.  In an interview reported in Pravda, Andropov stated:  
Now a decisive moment is indeed at hand: Either the interested states sit 
down at the negotiating table without delay and take up the drafting of a 
treaty prohibiting the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space, 
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or the arms race will spill over into space.”161 Negotiations were a cheap 
way to kill SDI.  In April, he proposed “Let the Soviet and American 
scientists…meet together and discuss the possible consequences of wide-
scale ABM systems.162  
In August, Andropov announced a unilateral moratorium on deploying any anti-
satellite (ASAT) weapons in space and, in addition, called for a ban on space-based 
weapons.  Both these efforts were obviously meant to kill the Strategic Defense Initiative 
and went nowhere with the United States.  Andropov’s view of the talks was invariably 
one-sided. Until his death he believed that in negotiations, “If we begin to make 
concessions defeat would be inevitable.”163  
In the meantime, Andropov’s health continued to deteriorate and after August 
1983, he stopped making public appearances.164 Relations between the superpowers 
spiraled down and reached the bottom when the Soviets walked out of the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces and Strategic Arms Reductions Talks in November 1983.  The 
primary trigger was the West German vote to deploy Pershing IIs, a source of great 
Soviet concern because they believed, incorrectly, that the missiles could reach 
Moscow.165 They demanded that the United States remove both the Pershing IIs and 
ground-based cruise missiles as a prerequisite to further arms control talks.166 However, 
the Strategic Defense Initiative was probably also a factor.167  
After Andropov’s death, the Chernenko Politburo adjusted some of the Soviet 
arms control offers.  On March 2, 1984, Chernenko proposed a ban on the militarization 
of space and called for U.S. withdrawal of its intermediate missiles from Europe.  In 
June, the Soviets put forward a plan for talks in Vienna to negotiate a treaty that would 
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ban weapons in space.  The U.S. defense initiative was apparently becoming at least as 
much of a concern to the Soviets as the intermediate missiles.  As was typical of Soviet 
propaganda proposals, the June offer was publicized within hours of its receipt by the 
U.S. State Department.  While the Soviets expected an out-of-hand rejection, to their 
surprise, the United States offered to negotiate.168 The American position was that space 
was already “militarized” by virtue of the ICBM’s that would pass through space in a 
nuclear exchange.  Instead of a ban on weapons in space, therefore, the United States 
offered to discuss the militarization of space, to include offensive and defensive 
weapons.169 The Soviets, caught off guard, evaded the issue, and both sides began to 
debate the title of the talks.170     
President Reagan’s landslide victory in November 1984 prompted the politburo to 
revisit negotiations with the United States and in January 1985, Secretary of State George 
Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met in Geneva to discuss future 
talks.171  By this time, Chernenko was often incapacitated so it was Mikhail Gorbachev 
who led the politburo session that outlined a strategy for Gromyko.172  Gorbachev 
insisted that Gromyko tie all nuclear arms reductions to a ban on space weapons, thus 
Gorbachev was a key factor in devising the linkage that would become the major obstacle 
at Reykjavik.  As Ambassador Dobrynin noted, 
While Reagan doggedly stuck to his Strategic Defense Initiative, 
Gorbachev convinced himself and the rest of the Soviet leadership that it 
had to be thwarted at all costs. The clash of these two opposing but fixed 
positions dominated our negotiations for years to come…173    
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Shultz and Gromyko eventually agreed on a framework in which intermediate-
range missiles, space-based weapons, and strategic weapons would be discussed based on 
their “interrelationship.” This wording was vague. The three issues could either be 
considered as dependent on each other or, if there was no interrelationship, they might be 
negotiated separately. Three delegations, one for each area, were to independently or 
collectively negotiate as required.174   
Overall, until the meeting between Gromyko and Shultz in January, talks were not 
progressing in large part because of the Soviet hard line on euromissiles and SDI.  This 
was exemplified in the Soviet walk out on negotiations in the fall of 1983.  The 
leadership’s preconditions for resuming dialogue was predicated on the United States 
abandoning SDI and done more for propaganda value than a desire to negotiate.  In 
addition, the Soviets hoped Reagan would lose his reelection bid in 1984 and were 
therefore hesitant to hand him a “victory” by agreeing to negotiations.  Moreover, the 
linkage between SDI and arms reductions Gromyko outlined in the winter of 1985 at 
Geneva was, in part, a product of Gorbachev’s own desires.  
C. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMUNITY 
Since the late 1960s, Soviet arms control policy had been largely formulated by 
the “Big Five,” consisting of the heads or representatives of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Ministry of Defense, the KGB, and the Military Industrial Commission (VPK).175 The 
idea was for the agencies to jointly determine coherent arms control objectives and 
policies.176 However, in practice the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs drafted 
proposals that were accepted without comment by the other agencies on the commission. 
The proposals were then presented for approval to the Politburo, which also did not 
critically analyze them and almost always signed off on the proposals.177 As a result, it 
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was actually the foreign minister, the defense minister, and of course the general 
secretary, should he choose to intervene, who conducted arms control policies.   
By the time the Soviets walked out on INF and START in the fall of 1983, the 
Big Five was nominally down to four.  Dimitri Ustinov, the minister of defense, as a full 
member of the Politburo, represented the communist party.178 In 1984, when Ustinov 
died, his replacement, seventy-three-year-old Marshall Sergey Sokolov, represented only 
the Ministry of Defense, so the CPSU was entirely left out of the details of arms control 
policy.   Since 1967 Sokolov had been the deputy minister of defense and thus could be 
expected to promote conservative polices similar to those of his predecessor.179 The 
Military Industrial Commission had been headed by Leonid Smirnov since 1963.180 
Andrei Gromyko, Stalin’s onetime ambassador to America and the most senior 
representative, had been appointed foreign minister in 1957.181 Viktor Chebrikov was in 
charge of the KGB.182 Chebrikov, a protégé of Andropov, believed like his mentor that 
the system was stalled and could better be fixed by focusing on problems such as 
corruption.183 All these decision makers were pickled in the Brezhnev-era arms control 
process. 
The Soviet policy of linking intermediate-range nuclear forces, strategic offensive 
weapons, and a ban on “space strike weapons” [SDI] in negotiations had been staked out 
by the Big Five.  Since the SALT II negotiations, the underlying logic was that Soviet 
strategic weapons could not be reduced until the threat of intermediate missiles in Europe 
was addressed.  From the Soviets’ perspective intermediate forces were also considered 
“strategic” if they could target Russia.184  In addition, the advent of SDI meant additional 
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ballistic missiles would probably be needed to penetrate the United States’ defense 
shield.  Therefore, the Strategic Defense Initiative had to be stopped before the Soviets 
would consider reducing strategic forces.185  
The Big Five saw SDI as a long-term research project of fifteen to twenty years 
whose ultimate goal was to develop an impenetrable shield.186  Their immediate concern 
was that in the near and mid-term, U.S. research could yield a system capable of stopping 
most missiles in a strike.  This theoretically would enable America to launch a 
preemptive first strike and withstand a weakened second strike from the USSR The Big 
Five all agreed that the main concern in negotiations was to stop the deployment of a U.S. 
missile defense. The most threatening aspect was space based missile defenses which 
from the Soviets’ perspective undermined strategic stability by posing a threat to 
satellites that provided early-warning and command-and-control communications.187  In 
negotiations, the Big Five believed the best option was to constrain SDI to their 
interpretation of the ABM Treaty.  Gromyko decided that the Soviet position should be 
that the ABM Treaty banned all research in sea, air, and land based missile defenses, not 
to mention space, and the rest of Big Five signed off without comment.188   
Below the Big Five, the agencies independently wrestled with how to react to 
SDI.   The Soviet general staff, for example, was not sure how to respond to either SDI or 
the Reagan defense buildup.  Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov, the chief of the general staff, 
argued that the military industrial complex needed to be revived.  Publicly, he called for a 
larger investment in defense.  Privately, he believed that the Soviet Union was highly 
inefficient, stagnant, and overly concerned with matching every U.S. project.189 
Apparently, just after the U.S. announcement of the defense initiative, Ogarkov had a 
personal conversation, not reported at the time, with a U.S. journalist regarding SDI. 
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We cannot equal the quality of U.S. arms for a generation or two.  Modern 
military power is based on technology, and technology is based on 
computers…Here we don’t even have computers in every office of the 
defense ministry.  And for reasons you well know, we cannot make 
computers widely available in our society.  We will never be able to catch 
up to you in modern arms until we have an economic revolution.  And the 
question is whether we can have an economic revolution without a 
political revolution.190  
Ogarkov was fired, probably for his behind the scenes efforts, by his boss, Dimitri 
Ustinov, in 1984.191 Most of the general staff called for increased funding, demanding a 
fourteen percent increase in the military budget.192 Ambassador Dobrynin quotes 
Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, Ogarkov’s replacement as chief of the General Staff, as 
stating he believed in a hard line across all fronts: 
National security along all azimuths. We proceed from the worst 
conceivable scenario of having to fight the United States, its allies, and 
probably Japan.  We must be prepared for any kind of fight with any kind 
of weapon.  Soviet military doctrine can be summed as follows: 1941 shall 
never be repeated.193  
Akhromeyev did however, believe troops could be reduced in central Europe and 
supported negotiations with the United States, though he wanted much smaller 
concessions than Gorbachev would eventually make.194  
In the KGB, the senior leadership feared that Reagan was planning to 
preemptively strike the Soviet Union. To gather information on this plot, in 1981, 
Andropov, KGB head at the time, initiated an operation code-named RYAN.195 It would 
remain the top priority of the First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate of the KGB 
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until Andropov’s death.196 By February 1983, the Soviet leadership was convinced that 
NATO would follow through with its “dual track” pledge and deploy Pershing II 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.197 To the KGB this meant the Reagan 
administration might be preparing for a preemptive nuclear strike. Adding to their 
concerns was the fact that U.S. fleets and squadrons were testing the Soviet alert systems. 
And thus Reagan’s “Star Wars” speech only increased Soviet unease.   
The Soviet’s shooting down of the Korean airliner, flight 700, reflected the KGB 
and the military’s anxiety.  After the plane strayed into Soviet airspace, it was shot down, 
probably in international airspace, by a fighter jet interceptor.198 All 269 passengers, 
including a U.S. congressman, were killed.199 The military had been on high alert due to 
the U.S. Navy’s recent testing of the Soviet defenses.  This, along with the general 
heightening of tensions between the superpowers probably played a significant role in the 
decision to shoot down the plane.  And the public relations fall-out from the incident only 
aroused even deeper suspicions of U.S. intentions and convinced the KGB that the whole 
episode was part of an American conspiracy. 200  
In the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Soviet defense industry saw an opportunity 
to expand its military projects.201 But the Soviet scientific community’s reaction to SDI 
was mixed. Since the 1960s, Soviet scientists had researched ballistic-missile defensive 
systems, and by 1972, the year of the ABM Treaty, they had concluded that missile 
defense was not possible with the available technology.  However, in 1976, public 
comments by an American general, George Keegan, convinced some Soviet weapons 
designers that the United States was also engaged in missile defense research. This 
stimulated debate among Soviet scientists to reconsider its feasibility.202 
                                                 
196 Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: the Mitrokhin Archive 
and the Secret History of the KGB, 1st ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 213. 
197 Evangelista, Unarmed Forces, 241. 
198 Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum," CIA, 11.  
199 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 535-536.  
200 Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum," CIA,12- 13.  
201 Podvig, "Did Star Wars Win the Cold War?," 5. 
202 Evangelista, Unarmed Forces, 234-235. 
 47
After the U.S. announcement of SDI, some scientists began to argue for the 
development of a Soviet missile defense system as well.  They were probably following 
in the footsteps of Vladimir Cheleomei who had been a proponent of BMD since the 
1960s.203  However, it does not appear, at least during this period, that the Soviets were 
seriously engaged in either research or testing of a missile defense system.  But, they did 
initiate countermeasure programs designed to defeat an American missile defense.  The 
“konkat” was one such program begun in direct response to SDI.  Initiated in 1984 but 
never deployed, it was an anti-satellite weapon, a plane-launched missile that would 
target the low-orbiting satellites of an American missile defense system.204  
Other prominent scientists, including Yevgeny Velikhov and Roald Sagdeev, 
argued that the Strategic Defense Initiative was just part of an American ruse to lure the 
Soviet Union into an expensive arms race that would undermine the Soviet economy.205 
Instead of playing the U.S. game, they argued, the Soviets should respond with either 
arms control negotiations or relatively inexpensive countermeasures.206 Cheap 
alternatives could come from projects already in the works, such as the “Skif” project 
begun in 1976. It involved building a laser system that would be deployed in space as an 
anti-satellite weapon via Buran, the Soviet space shuttle.  Until 1984, “Skif” had been 
stalled because no laser existed that could orbit in space. But that summer, Skif-D was 
authorized.  It took a laser, the “Drief” airborne laser, from another project to aid in 
continuing the research while a suitable laser for “Skif” was being developed.207  By 
1985, other low-cost solutions were also being discussed, which included concentrating 
mobile ICBMs, indirect countermeasures to lasers, and modifying missiles to decrease 
their boost-phase time.208 
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D. CONCLUSION 
Information about the Soviet reaction to the Strategic Defense Initiative during 
the two-year period from 1983 to March 1985 sheds some light on the three schools of 
thought pertaining to the role of SDI in ending the Cold War.  The pro SDI school falls 
short.  For one thing, the Soviets did not invest many resources to counter SDI, and it 
does not appear that they seriously considered developing a Soviet SDI.  Nor did the 
existence of SDI cause a Soviet reformation: there were no significant economic or other 
reforms under either Andropov or Chernenko.  Moreover, during this period, the Soviet 
response to SDI was muddled.  Andropov’s reaction was paradoxical: he agreed that 
negotiations should take place but said that no concessions were permissible.  Members 
of the defense bureaucracy seemed to believe that if negotiations failed, an arms race 
would be inevitable and would cripple the Soviet economy.  But they offered no other 
solution. While the scientists did suggest an alternative in the form of cheap 
countermeasures, they were not sure what those countermeasures might be. 
A second thing to consider is that it can be argued, in support of the anti-SDI 
school, that during this period, the defense initiative was a factor that extended the Cold 
War.   The Soviet decision to suspend talks in the fall of 1983 was based largely on the 
euromissile issue; SDI’s role was probably minimal.   However, SDI was a factor in 
Soviet unwillingness to seriously negotiate until after Reagan’s reelection, as the Soviets 
wanted Reagan to lose in the belief that another administration would be easier to work 
with.  Thus in a sense, SDI helped extend the Cold War since it played a role in the 
Soviet decision to delay a resumption of negotiations.   
However, once Reagan won reelection and a mandate for his polices, SDI became 
a strong incentive for the USSR to negotiate.  The Soviets were intimidated by the 
economic and technical challenges of the Strategic Defense Initiative, which underscored 
fears about the Soviets’ weak economy and America’s technological edge.  As a result, 
Andropov and later Chernenko and even Gorbachev, along with the scientists, and the 
Big Five wanted to use negotiations to defeat the United States’ initiative.  In addition,  
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the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and the general themes of Soviet propaganda 
also appeared to be efforts to win world opinion toward stopping an arms race in space, 
in other words, to end SDI.   
But, SDI was only one of many external factors influencing Soviet foreign policy.  
The euromissile situation was a factor, as were the American PSYOPs operations and the 
general increase in U.S. defense spending.  The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative 
contributed to U.S.-Soviet instability by initiating what was perceived by the Soviets as 
an initial step in an arms race that they could defeat only through negotiations.  
Andropov’s public and private comments and Ambassador Dobrynin’s statements make 
this clear.  The reactions of the Soviet defense industry and scientific community also 
support this thesis.  Overall, it is difficult to determine the degree to which SDI added to 
Soviet fears.  It does seem evident, however, as we have shown here, that SDI was not, at 
least not yet, the number one foreign policy issue for the Soviet leadership.  Therefore, of 
the three schools of thought, the argument that SDI was a secondary factor is the most 
accurate for the period from 1983 to 1985. 
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V. ENTER GORBACHEV: MARCH 1985-OCTOBER 1986 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Soviet reactions to the Strategic Defense Initiative from March 1985 to October 
1986 support the anti-SDI thesis that the defense initiative complicated talks and 
extended the Cold War.  However, the evidence also shows that SDI was a positive 
secondary factor which gave Gorbachev another incentive to negotiate with the United 
States.  The selection of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary in March 1985 marked 
the start of a new era in U.S.–Soviet relations. Gorbachev was a different type of leader 
than his predecessors.  He was young, more than twenty years junior to the other 
members of the politburo.209 He grew up during the relatively nonviolent, at least 
compared to the Stalin era, political environment of Khrushchev.  Khrushchev tried to 
adjust the Soviet system to make it more efficient but the underlying weaknesses of the 
command economy were not addressed and his efforts in part lead to his fall from power.  
Similar to Khrushchev, Gorbachev moved to improve the system.  He wanted to revive 
the domestic economy and sought a return to détente which had so benefited the Soviets 
in the 1970s.  But in order to successfully enact domestic reforms, Gorbachev felt he 
needed first to come to terms with the United States and to defuse the growing tension 
between the superpowers.  Consequently, Gorbachev’s first foreign policy objective was 
to meet with Reagan.  He found a willing but tough partner in the American president.210 
As we have seen, Reagan had been pushing for a meeting with a Soviet leader since 1981 
and had redoubled his efforts in early 1984.  Reagan wanted to lower the risks of 
confrontation, eliminate nuclear weapons, increase understanding through dialogue, and 
encourage the Soviet Union to improve its behavior regarding human rights.211  For 
Reagan these four areas were linked, and on top of this, he would not budge on SDI.   
Though Reagan and Gorbachev both shared some common objectives, negotiations at the 
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Geneva Summit, which took place November 19–21, 1985, were difficult and the 
Strategic Defense Initiative was the main source of contention.  Reagan offered to work 
with the Soviets in research and testing but made clear that he would also move forward 
with the U.S. program regardless of Soviet opposition.  For Gorbachev, SDI, which he 
described as “space based weapons,” was a deal breaker to any agreement.  He did not 
believe the Americans would share technology and saw SDI as not only a defensive but 
also an offensive weapon system.  Nevertheless, the Geneva Summit was judged a 
success by both sides: it was the first meeting in seven years between the leaders of the 
world’s two great powers, who agreed to meet again soon in Washington and Moscow 
for two more summits.  However, the Reykjavik summit that was initiated by Gorbachev 
and took place in October 1986 was more ambiguous. With an ultimate aim to eliminate 
all nuclear weapons, the two sides came close to an agreement that would do away with 
all intermediate missiles in Europe and reduce all strategic nuclear weapons by fifty 
percent.  But once again they could not agree on SDI and Reykjavik ended without a 
treaty.  Still, Gorbachev came away from the meeting with the impression that a major 
agreement would soon be reached. 
Between 1985 and the fall of 1986, the Soviet security community’s influence 
began to decline. While the role of the Big Five expanded, departments lead by 
Gorbachev’s allies became closely involved in formulating arms-control policies. The 
Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, a Cold War stalwart, retired and was replaced by 
Eduard Shevardnadze, a close ally of Gorbachev. The Ministry of Defense, which had 
been resistant to Gorbachev’s arms control ideas, was out-maneuvered by the general 
secretary in 1986 and grudgingly supported the abolition of nuclear weapons. The April 
1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident also cost the military and defense industry political 
capital.  However, the defense establishment probably played a role in ensuring the 
linkage between SDI, INF and START at the Reykjavik Summit.  The KGB continued its 
history as more of an observer in arms control policy though it remained a part of the Big 
Five. Lastly, the scientific community probably supported Gorbachev’s overall efforts to 
reform the Soviet system and undermine the United States’ SDI effort.  In short, though  
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Gorbachev had to contend with a number of domestic rivals, he was moderately 
successful in establishing control over the government bureaucracies and instituting his 
own policies.  
B. GENERAL SECRETARY  
1. A Different Type of Soviet Leader 
Mikhail Sergei Gorbachev became General Secretary on March 11, 1985.  At age 
fifty two, he was the youngest General Secretary since Stalin.  His fast climb up the 
communist ladder was in part the result of his own talents.  But he had also developed 
powerful contacts with influential Soviet decision-makers such as Andropov and Fedor 
Kulakov, head of the Department of Agriculture of the Central Committee.212 In 1978, 
when Kulakov died, Gorbachev returned to Moscow and was promoted from First Party 
Secretary of the Stavropol region to Kulakov’s post. In 1980, he became a full member, 
by far its youngest, of the Politburo.213 Within the party, Gorbachev was seen as 
Andropov’s protégé, an agent for change in a system that most of the Politburo 
recognized was faltering.  Five years later, following Chernenko’s death, Gorbachev was 
appointed General Secretary.  
But why Gorbachev?  In addressing this question, Archie Brown describes four 
main factors that contributed to Gorbachev’s ascension to General Secretary.  First, on 
the night Chernenko died, Gorbachev and his supporters moved quickly.  Gorbachev held 
a meeting to determine who would lead the funeral commission: he was chosen.  This is 
significant because, since Stalin’s death, whoever chaired the commission became the 
next General Secretary. They held the meeting immediately because three members of 
the Politburo who were not Gorbachev’s allies were away from Moscow and thus unable 
to attend.214 Second, at the time, Gorbachev showed no inclination to deviate from 
traditional Soviet foreign policy with the West.  Therefore, the elders did not see in him 
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the radical reformer he would become. Third, like Andropov, he was seen as someone 
who could tinker with the system and improve it.215  Fourth, Gorbachev was young, and 
the Politburo believed that, internationally, it was not advisable to present another 
geriatric Soviet leader to the world.216  
Gorbachev was a new type of Soviet leader.  He was the only general secretary to 
have been born after the Russian Revolution, his most formative political years were not 
spent under Stalin, and his political education did not occur under a regime that routinely 
and violently purged its ranks.  When Stalin died in 1953, Gorbachev was a twenty-two-
year-old law student at Moscow State University.217  Gorbachev’s political coming-of-
age was under Nikita Khrushchev, during what one Russian specialist, Martin Malia, 
describes as the first Soviet attempt at “reform communism.” 
Reform communism has three characteristics.  First, it attempts to distance 
communism from Stalinism.  Khrushchev did this when he released millions from the 
gulag and when he attacked the cult of Stalinism by admonishing some of Stalin’s crimes 
in a speech to the twentieth congress in 1956.218   
In addition, reform communism tries to reinvigorate the economy through some 
decentralization of the command system and by providing incentives for individuals to 
profit.  One major flaw of the command system was poor resource allocation.  The state 
did not want any industries to fail and therefore imposed what economist Janos Kornai 
described as “soft budget” constraints.219  Industries, specifically the defense industry, 
consumed large amounts of resources because they had no incentive to do otherwise.  
This then deprived Soviet citizens of goods and led to shortages.220 The terrible 
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inefficiencies eventually resulted in drasticly diminishing returns that were difficult to 
improve because they were a direct result of the Soviet command system.221  Khrushchev 
tried to improve the economic system and the welfare of the people by tinkering 
catastrophically with the agricultural industry and decentralizing some control of the 
economy, which was designed for war mobilization.222  But he could not overcome the 
underlying weaknesses of the Soviet command economy because the system could not 
function unless it was centralized.   
Finally, reform communism seeks to lower the tensions with the West to decrease 
the need for mobilization and constant preparation for war.223 Khrushchev sought 
“peaceful coexistence” with the West to decrease the risk of nuclear war and the 
economic burden on the Soviet Union.224  His various attempts at reform faced strong 
conservative domestic opposition that in part eventually led to his removal from power in 
1964.  A little over twenty years later, Gorbachev would pursue all three aspects of 
reform communism to try and overcome many of the same problems in the Soviet 
system. 
Second, Gorbachev was the first college educated head of the Soviet Union since 
Lenin.225  He was comfortable with intellectuals and brought the inputs of Soviet 
academia into the government’s decision making process.226 This also reflected 
Gorbachev’s desire to constructively criticize the system in order to improve it.  In 
addition, Gorbachev had traveled abroad much more often than his predecessors.227  He 
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saw first hand the sharp contrast in living standards between East and West.228  Also, 
because of his experiences in the West, Gorbachev was perhaps more willing and better 
able to work with Western leaders.  
2. Perestroika and Foreign Policy 
Gorbachev, a true believer in communism, wanted to strengthen the Soviet Union 
relative to the West. Like his predecessors, he believed socialism was the next inevitable 
stage after capitalism.229 In a speech to the Politburo in 1985, he noted, “We do not need 
to change policy. It is correct and it is true.  It is genuine Leninist Policy.  We need, 
however, to accelerate, to move forward, to disclose shortcomings and overcome them 
and realize our shining future.”230  In fulfilling that agenda, the acceleration of reform 
became Gorbachev’s chief obsession.  He wanted to revive the entire system, as Lenin 
had supposedly done with his New Economic Policy (NEP) in the 1920s.231  As defined 
by Anatoly Chernyaev, Gorbachev’s chief foreign policy aide, the central issue of what 
became known as perestroika, or economic restructuring, was that “the improvement and 
consequent strengthening of the socialist system, its increasing power, were meant to 
attain a stronger position in the competition with capitalism.”232 
To be successful in this effort of perestroika, Gorbachev felt he had to “create 
favorable external conditions,” and thus Soviet foreign policy became closely tied to 
domestic reform.233  There were three main reasons for this. First, the Soviet Union’s 
economic resources were terribly misallocated in favor of “guns over butter.” Estimates 
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of the economy’s dedication to military affairs range from twenty to forty percent.234 
Gorbachev believed that, if he could reduce tensions with the West, he might gain the 
domestic political power necessary to override the defense industry’s hold on the 
economy.235 Second, better relations with the West would also mean greater access to 
financial and technological transfers that could be used to revive the Soviet economy. 
Third, Soviet foreign policy was the one area of the government that Gorbachev found 
relatively easy to control. Unlike the multiple bureaucracies that were involved in 
managing the economy, relations with the West were dominated by the foreign and 
defense ministries.236 And on the public stage, Gorbachev could more easily 
outmaneuver the defense establishment. Under the scrutiny of the international arena, it 
would be less able to offer mere platitudes while at the same time doing nothing to 
change the status quo.237  
Gorbachev and his advisors decided that the best way to start was to formulate an 
intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty.238 This was a practical approach for two main 
reasons. First, since the Soviet Union believed that Pershing II missiles could launch a 
decapitating strike on Moscow, the intermediate-missile situation was seen as a clear and 
present danger.  Second, the whole affair had greatly increased tensions with Europe and 
America, and reducing that tension would not only ease the threat to Moscow, but also 
help bring a return to detente.   
3. Centralizing Power 
Although Gorbachev was the most powerful person in the Soviet Union, to 
implement his polices he needed to either replace the old guard or gain their support.  
Initially, he managed to appease conservatives by publicly maintaining much of the 
current foreign policy toward the West.  At the same time, however, Gorbachev moved to 
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take the reins of foreign policy firmly in his own hands.  He made an important foreign-
affairs personnel move in July 1985 by replacing the foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, 
who had been a key player in Gorbachev’s appointment as general secretary.239 
Nonetheless, it would not be easy for Gorbachev to change direction with him in place 
since Gromyko had helped formulate the policies Gorbachev wanted to alter.240 In 
making the decision, Gorbachev was helped by Gromyko’s desire to retire to the largely 
ceremonial position of chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.241 The 
new foreign minister was Eduard Shevardnadze, the former head of the Georgian 
communist party and a politician with no foreign policy experience.242 Shevardnadze’s 
major qualification was his close relationship with Gorbachev.243 They had been friends 
for over twenty years.  Also, Shevardnadze had no strong connections in the Kremlin; he 
was somebody Gorbachev could entirely depend on.244 Gorbachev’s reasoning for 
establishing new blood in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is reflected in his conversations 
with both Shevardnadze and Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United 
States.  In April, Gorbachev told Dobrynin privately that Soviet domestic reforms could 
not move forward until the arms race was brought to an end.245  And when Shevardnadze 
was appointed, Gorbachev revealed his belief that the arms race would never end unless 
Gromyko and his allies were replaced.246 
That same year, Gorbachev also promoted Alexander Yakovlev to the Central 
Committee's Propaganda Department.  Yakovlev had been considered too liberal in the 
Brezhnev years and in 1972 was sent far from Moscow to be ambassador to Canada. In 
1983, Gorbachev had brought him back from political exile to head the Institute for 
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International Relations and World Economy.247 When Gorbachev became general 
secretary, Yakovlev quickly became another trusted foreign and domestic policy 
advisor.248  
In yet another political move, in February 1986, Anatoly Chernyaev became 
Gorbachev’s personal assistant for foreign affairs. Chernyaev had previously worked in 
the Central Committee International Department which, before Gorbachev, was 
considered a rival of the foreign ministry.  Chernyaev was well versed in Soviet foreign 
policy and often critical of the way it had been conducted.249 Finally, Gorbachev 
departed from his predecessors by actively consulting with international affairs specialists 
in the academic institutes.250 These early changes in advisors and the inclusion of the 
academic institutes were a strong signal that the old ways of conducting foreign policy 
were over. 
4.  LEAD UP TO GENEVA 
The day after Gorbachev became General Secretary, Reagan sent a letter 
requesting a meeting which commenced a flurry of high-level dialogue between the 
superpowers.251  Gorbachev and Reagan exchanged numerous letters that covered a wide 
range of issues – from human rights to Afghanistan to the shooting of U.S. Army Major 
Arthur Nicholson in East Germany – and focused on setting a date for a summit.  Over 
the summer they finally agreed to have a meeting on “nuclear and space talks” to be held 
at Geneva in November, 1985.  
On September 27, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met with Reagan and Secretary 
of State George Shultz at the White House and presented the Soviet position: both sides 
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should agree to ban weapons in space and to reduce their total number of strategic 
missiles by fifty percent. Then, a separate agreement could be reached on all 
intermediate-range missiles in Europe, including Britain and France.252  The offer was 
probably in part a reaction to Reagan’s speech four days earlier announcing the formation 
of the American Armed Forces United Space Command, the organization that would 
manage the strategic defense initiative.253  The preliminary talks continued at high levels 
through October and November.  The defense initiative dominated these meetings and 
was a source of great tension.  For example, during a conversation with Shultz on 
November 5, Gorbachev claimed that the military industrial complex governed U.S. 
foreign policy and that the defense initiative was meant solely to gain an edge over the 
Soviet Union.254 
During the summer, Gorbachev focused on Europe as well.  One reason for this 
effort was probably a memorandum by Alexander Yakovlev which surmised that a 
motive behind Reagan’s invitation to meet was to “confine our relations with the West to 
the Soviet-American framework (the USA is watching its allies with concern).”255 
Consequently, Gorbachev spent much of the summer trying to widen the cleavage 
between Europe and the United States. He wanted to turn public opinion in Europe 
completely against both the “euromissiles” and SDI.   
 In April, for example, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would halt its 
deployment of 414 SS-20s in Europe until November and would end the deployments 
thereafter if the United States pledged to end the deployment of Perishing II and cruise 
missiles to its NATO allies.  This offer was rejected by NATO.256  In July, Gorbachev 
declared a unilateral five month moratorium on nuclear tests beginning in August and 
extending indefinitely, again, if the United States would agree to do the same. But 
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because the ban would not be verified, the Americans rejected the offer.257  In Paris in 
October, Gorbachev announced a new modified plan for intermediate-range nuclear 
forces, offering to reduce the total number of SS-20s that could reach Europe to pre-
Pershing levels. That meant that the Soviets would cut the number of SS-20s to 243, the 
quantity in place before the Pershing IIs were deployed.  In exchange, according to his 
plan, the United States would remove all its Pershing II missiles from Europe.258  This, 
like the April offer was a departure from the previous Soviet position that strategic 
weapons, intermediate weapons, and missile defense be all part of one package.259 
However, all these offers were sprung on the United States with little warning, which 
implied to American policy makers that Gorbachev was merely acting on the well-worn 
Soviet propaganda stage.260    
Gorbachev’s public relations campaign also involved many interviews, one of 
which, in Time Magazine in August 1985, indicated that SDI, arms control, and financial 
transfers were high on his list of priorities. “You ask what changes in the world economy 
could be of benefit to the Soviet Union,” Gorbachev said. “First of all, although this 
belongs more to politics than economics, an end to the arms race. We should prefer to use 
every ruble that today goes for defense in order to meet civilian, peaceful needs.”261 He 
went on to comment on the need for more free trade in general and greater trade between 
the Soviet Union and the United States in particular. On SDI, the general secretary 
claimed that it would “whip up an arms race.”  
First of all, we do not consider it to be a research program. In our view it 
is the first stage of the project to develop a new ABM system prohibited 
under the relevant treaty of 1972.262  
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Finally, in discussing the economy, Gorbachev blustered, “Countless attempts 
were made in the past to force the Soviet Union to its knees, to exhaust it. All those 
attempts failed and such attempts in the future will fail too.”263    
5. Geneva: November 19-20, 1985 
The United States and the Soviet Union saw the Geneva Summit as a first step in 
returning to dialogue and reducing tension. It was the first summit in almost seven years, 
so holding high-level talks was seen by both sides as a success in itself.264 The Reagan 
administration addressed four areas (outlined here in chapter III): human rights, third 
world expansionism, arms reductions and ballistic missile defense, and increased 
exchanges and cooperation.265  Trade was not on the U.S. agenda; in keeping with 
National Security Decision Directive 75, Reagan wanted to use trade as a carrot to help 
shape Soviet behavior.266 Gorbachev was focused on stopping the arms race.  The Soviet 
approach remained the same as that outlined in the January 1985 meeting between Shultz 
and Gromyko: strategic arms reductions, intermediate-range forces reductions, and 
strategic defense issues were linked.  Gorbachev’s April and October offers for a separate 
agreement on the euromissiles were not a part of his negotiating position at Geneva.267  
Gorbachev began the summit by reiterating his claim that the Soviet economy was 
stronger than ever and that America could not hope to weaken it with an arms race.  But 
he also called for more trade with the United States.  Both countries, he said, needed to 
decrease their defense burdens to free up resources for civilian consumption.268  In that 
regard, Ambassador Jack Matlock believed Gorbachev was “leading with his chin.”269  It 
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was no secret that the Soviet economy was in trouble.  Gorbachev’s statements, therefore, 
simply reinforced Reagan’s decision to use trade as a leverage to gain concessions.270  In 
addition, they probably also strengthened Reagan’s belief that Gorbachev’s economic and 
technological based fears of SDI could be used to pry concessions.  
Ultimately, the Strategic Defense Initiative was the main point of contention at 
Geneva. On this issue, disagreements between the two sides were highlighted during a 
private conversation between Reagan and Gorbachev on November 19.  Reagan modified 
Shevardnadze’s September proposal to reduce strategic weapons by fifty percent in 
exchange for an agreement to ban weapons in space.  But instead of banning space-based 
weapons, Reagan proposed that both countries do joint research on strategic defense in 
“open laboratories,” meaning that Soviet and American experts would monitor each 
other’s work.  If a feasible missile defense was discovered, the two superpowers would 
share it.  Then, he added, they could jointly eliminate all of their nuclear stockpiles.271  
Reagan also noted that any missile defense was in the distant future and that SDI was a 
long-term research project.  In addition, he proposed an intermediate nuclear forces 
treaty, an agreement that would exclude British and French missiles. 
Gorbachev had four issues with Reagan’s offer. First, the Strategic Defense 
Initiative could never result in a defensive system that would be able to stop a large 
strike. Therefore, he reasoned, “the only possible use of a strategic defense was to defend 
against a weakened retaliatory second strike, not a first strike.” To talk of reducing 
strategic nuclear weapons was folly then, since the Soviet response to SDI would 
probably involve an increase of strategic nuclear missiles.272   
Second, Gorbachev addressed Reagan’s offer for a separate INF Treaty aimed at 
eliminating all intermediate-range nuclear missiles.273  Gorbachev implied that an 
agreement would have to include British and French intermediate-range forces as well.  
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In addition, Reagan’s offer only addressed land-based cruise missiles, not those launched 
from sea or air.   Third, Gorbachev argued, testing of ballistic missile defenses should be 
confined to laboratories.  Under his interpretation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty, no testing of prototypes was allowed. 
So, in regard to strategic arms reductions (START), Gorbachev tied limitations to 
ballistic-missile defense research.  His proposed offer was a joint statement banning 
strategic defense research.  His fall-back position seemed to be to confine SDI to a strict 
interpretation of the ABM treaty, whereby no testing would be done outside laboratories. 
Gorbachev did not directly link SDI to the proposed elimination of intermediate-range 
missiles.  Instead, the hold-up was British and French missiles and his desire to include 
sea and air-launched cruise missiles.  The overall Soviet position, in place since the fall 
of 1984, was to link strategic defense, strategic arms reductions, and intermediate-range 
forces.  Therefore, whatever held up one area of negotiations held up the entire package.  
Gorbachev implied that if Reagan would end the Strategic Defense Initiative an 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty was possible.  With the SDI, no treaty was doable.  At 
one point on the last day of talks, when Reagan once again proposed an INF agreement 
and shared SDI research, Gorbachev lost his temper and exclaimed, “Do you take us for 
idiots?”274  
Despite its conflicts, the Geneva Summit ended with an agreement to hold two 
more summits over two years, one in Washington and another in Moscow.  In addition, 
the superpowers agreed to continue high-level dialogue on arms control and other issues. 
Even though a treaty was not signed, Geneva was judged a success by both sides and the 
world.275 Tensions between the superpowers lessened as Reagan and Gorbachev 
developed a relationship.  On nuclear arsenals there was some agreement. The Soviets for 
the first time approved, in principal, to on-site verification of any disarmament 
agreements.276 Both sides also agreed to discuss a fifty percent reduction in strategic 
weapons.  The United States altered its position on intermediate-range forces, taking the 
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global “zero option” off the table: not all intermediate missiles needed to be eliminated. 
277  But, as noted, Reagan and Gorbachev were deadlocked over SDI.  Gorbachev was 
hindered somewhat in the negotiations not only by the framework but also by Soviet 
violations of the ABM Treaty. Gorbachev called SDI, “space weapons,” and denied the 
Soviets possessed any.   But by Gromyko’s 1984 definition, the Soviet’s anti-satellite 
weapons tests and the BMD system around Moscow were space weapons.278  
Gorbachev also accused Reagan of violating the ABM Treaty with SDI. The 
American side pointed to the Krasnoyarsk radar station, citing Article VI of the ABM 
Treaty which called on the signatories “not to deploy in the future radars for early 
warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its 
national territory and oriented outward.”279 But the Krasnoyarsk station was well within 
Soviet boundaries, and the Americans were able to show it could be part of an early-
warning missile defense system.280 The United States clearly indicated it was grounds for 
America to walk away from the ABM Treaty and not adhere to any of its possible limits 
on strategic defense research and deployment.281 
6. After Geneva 
The months following Geneva were not promising.  Reagan pushed Gorbachev 
for a date on the Washington Summit which was originally supposed to occur sometime 
in the summer of 1986.  But Gorbachev refused, arguing that he would not agree to a 
summit unless the working groups could develop a substantial arms-control agreement in 
which the United States would also agree to constrain SDI.282    
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Nonetheless, Gorbachev did want to expand on the groundwork laid at Geneva.  
He coveted an arms control agreement to curtail the arms race, decrease tension between 
the superpowers, and reach an agreement to remove intermediate-range missiles from 
Western Europe, which he described as a “pistol to our head.”283 Moreover, an 
agreement would decrease the defense burden on the Soviet economy and allow him to 
move more quickly with Perestroika.284  He spoke about this to the Politburo in January 
1986.  
Our main goal now is to prevent the arms race from reaching a new stage. 
If we don’t do that the danger will increase…. We will be drawn into an 
arms race that we cannot manage. We will lose, because right now we are 
already at the end of our tether.285  
The “arms race,” in large part, was SDI.  
For Gorbachev to maintain his power base during the challenging efforts of 
perestroika, he had to be seen within the Soviet apparatchik as defending Soviet interests 
abroad.286 The central security threat, as perceived by Gorbachev, was SDI.287  He 
continued to push, therefore, for an agreement to reduce nuclear stockpiles contingent on 
restricting the strategic defense initiative.  For instance, on January 16, 1986, Gorbachev 
unveiled a new proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons, including those owned by 
Britain and France, by the year 2000.  The process would begin with an agreement to cut 
strategic forces by fifty percent.  But a prerequisite was that the United States abandon 
SDI.  As with the Soviet proposals in 1985, the United States was given no time to 
respond before the offer was made public.  Still, the Americans at least entertained the 
idea, while the British and French refused to consider it.288    
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7. To a Surprise Summit  
Throughout the summer of 1986 Gorbachev felt his reforms were not moving 
quickly enough.289 He constantly urged his bureaucracy to move faster.  But, for 
Gorbachev, domestic and foreign policy were linked and the Cold War was stifling his 
efforts.  Consequently, he decided on a bold move: to invite Reagan to a surprise summit 
and present him with a new initiative.  According to Chernyaev, Gorbachev’s goal was 
“to force Reagan to agree to the summit that was necessary for one vital goal of 
perestroika – the easing of the military burden.”290  Gorbachev explained this in a speech 
to the Politburo in October: “The United States has an interest in keeping the negotiations 
machine running idle, while the arms race overburdens our economy. That is why we 
need a breakthrough; we need the process to start moving.”  He went on to add, “The 
most important task is to prevent a new round of arms race, [and] ‘Tridents,’ 
‘Minuteman’ . . . entering space with weapons.  Then [we will face] a loss on all sides, 
because first and foremost it will lead to a wearing-out of our economy.”291   
As a site for the surprise summit, Gorbachev chose Reykjavik, in part because it 
was half way between the superpowers, but also because Gorbachev did not want to go to 
Washington until he was sure there would be an agreement to sign.  Chernyaev advised 
Gorbachev to use a three-part strategy at Reykjavik.  First, the Strategic Defense 
Initiative should be de-linked from strategic arms reductions, and the fifty-percent 
reduction emphasized by Gorbachev should be agreed on regardless of other issues.  
Second, on intermediate-range missiles, the Soviet position should be no intermediate 
missiles in Europe.  However, they should go along with the American position that 
French and British missiles should be excluded from an agreement.292 Third, the ABM 
treaty should be tied to SDI by emphasizing a nuclear test ban.  Chernyaev recommended 
this because, at the time, SDI was largely associated with Edward Teller’s idea of a space 
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based laser powered by a nuclear explosion in space.293 According to Chernyaevs’s 
thinking, “if there is no testing, there will be no SDI.”294 Gorbachev accepted most of 
Chernyaevs’s proposals, but he made a key decision to keep SDI linked to both an INF 
treaty and strategic weapons reduction.  
Gorbachev advised his group preparing for the Reykjavik summit that, regarding 
SDI, “Our goal is to prevent the next round of an arms race. If we do not do this … we 
will lose this race because we are presently at the limit of our capability.”295 He stressed 
this idea repeatedly. Gorbachev pushed his advisors and the Politburo to be prepared to 
make real concessions in order to reach an agreement with the United States.296 He also 
explained the reasoning behind the Soviet position that SDI should be confined to the 
laboratory. 
We must bring out the ABM [anti-missile defense] issue and link it with 
the ban on nuclear testing. How do we approach this? Start with the fact 
that up until now orders to resume talks on a full testing ban have not been 
issued. Are the Americans going to join the moratorium or not? We will 
not raise this question for now, as well as the question whether we 
ourselves will resume [testing]. Because if we sit down at the negotiating 
table with a goal to reach an agreement within two years, why would 
Congress assign money for this. But if testing is stopped and we do not 
pull out of the ABM treaty (beyond laboratory experiments), it will be a 
blow to the SDI and to prospects of space weapons development in 
general. 
Gorbachev felt an agreement was not only necessary for him, but for Reagan as 
well.  The summit, scheduled for October, was carefully timed to occur just before U.S. 
congressional elections. No agreement reached at Reykjavik, therefore, was expected to 
hurt Republican chances of keeping a senate majority. Gorbachev sensed that Reagan  
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wanted to go down in history as a peace president and that that would override the efforts 
of right-wingers and the military-industrial complex to push the president to hold fast on 
SDI.297   
8. The Reykjavik Summit: 11-12 October, 1986 
During the opening days of the Reykjavik Summit, Reagan attempted to tie arms 
control reductions to the issue of improved human rights in the Soviet Union and, more 
specifically, to the need for improved emigration polices.298 Gorbachev was not 
interested in that linkage; he wanted to focus only on arms control.299 He offered a three-
point proposal, presented as a package.  
Point one: Both sides would reduce strategic nuclear weapons by fifty percent. 
But the American negotiators disagreed on the use of the term “strategic,” arguing these 
were not nuclear weapons launched from carrier planes, etc., but rather weapons such as 
intercontinental ballistic missiles.  The Soviets eventually accepted the U.S. definition.300  
Gorbachev also seemed to agree with a new Reagan proposal offered late in the summit 
to eliminate all nuclear weapons within ten years.301 
Point two of the Soviet package: In regard to intermediate nuclear forces (INF), 
Gorbachev dropped the Soviet requirement that British and French missiles also be 
included in negotiations.  He proposed instead a “zero option in Europe” and negotiation 
on the number of Soviet intermediate missiles in Asia.302  Reagan disagreed.  The 
president’s “zero option” had been for a global zero, the elimination of all intermediate 
missiles.  He argued that because intermediate missiles were highly mobile, they could be 
moved easily from Asia to target Europe.303  Nonetheless, after substantial discussion, 
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Reagan agreed to Gorbachev’s proposal, and both agreed that one hundred Soviet 
intermediate missiles could remain in Asia.304 
Point three: Both sides would adhere to the Soviet interpretation of the ABM 
Treaty for ten years, during which time missile defense research would be confined to the 
laboratory, and all nuclear testing and anti-satellite weapons would be banned.305  On the 
issue of nuclear testing, Reagan and Gorbachev found a middle ground that would allow 
for a step-by-step approach.306  But they could not agree on the Strategic Defense 
Initiative.  Thus, their respective interpretations of the ABM treaty remained a sticking 
point.  Gorbachev argued that it precluded testing outside the laboratory.  Reagan 
contended that even a strict interpretation allowed for research and testing of missile 
defenses.  While admitting that he did not know whether SDI would result in a feasible 
missile defense, Reagan would not agree to constrain research to the laboratory because 
that would violate the pledge he had made in his 1983 speech to the American people.   
Reagan suggested that they replace the ABM treaty with a new agreement which 
would allow missile defense research and development within America’s interpretation of 
the ABM treaty.  If either country decided to go beyond those limits, it would be required 
to invite experts from the other to observe the tests.  If either country developed a 
workable missile defense, it would share it and eliminate all of its remaining strategic 
missiles within three years.307  Gorbachev was against the offer.  
I cannot take your idea of sharing SDI seriously. You are not willing to 
share with us your oil-well equipment, digitally guided machine tools, or 
even milking machines.  Sharing SDI would provoke a second American 
revolution! Let’s be realistic and pragmatic.308  
In reality, the argument over testing and sharing was a battle over the continuation 
of the Strategic Defense Initiative.  Like Gorbachev, Reagan believed that if he agreed to 
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limit SDI to laboratory testing, Congress would cut its funding and the initiative would 
die on the vine.309  So Reagan refused to limit SDI testing and Gorbachev refused to 
break up his three-point package to at least allow agreements on their common-ground 
issues.  As a result, the Reykjavik Summit ended in a stalemate. 
C. NATIONAL SECURITY COMMUNITY 
By late 1986, the national security community had lost some influence in 
formulating Soviet foreign policy but remained a powerful set of actors Gorbachev had to 
negotiate with to institute arms control polices and of course perestroika.  Gorbachev 
modified the way the Big Five formulated arms negotiations, increasing its role in 
formulating policy.  But he also increased the roles of the Central Committee of the 
CPSU which as noted had faded away from the Big Five and the International 
Department, formerly seen by Gromyko as a foreign policy rival.  The interagency 
process of formulating policy was revived but under the careful watch of Gorbachev and 
his confidants. 
The power of all the resistant bureaucracies were weakened because of the lack of 
support they found in Shevardnadze, the new foreign minister.  For example, under 
Gromyko, the Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defense had often dictated arms control 
agreements, with Shevardnadze this was impossible. 
While Gorbachev did not seriously contend with entrenched military spending 
habits until 1988, he did immediately take steps to minimize the political power of the 
military establishment.  He chose not to elevate Minister of Defense Marshall Sergei 
Sokolov, who had taken Dimitri Ustinov’s place in 1984, to be a full member of the 
Politburo.  It was the first time since the 1960’s the Minister of Defense was left out of 
the inner circle of power.310   
Gorbachev also outmaneuvered Sokolov.  Soon after Geneva, as the general 
secretary pushed the defense industry to develop a compromise that would assure an 
                                                 
309 Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 229.  
310 Malia, The Soviet Tragedy, 415. 
 72
agreement with the Americans, the military moved to outflank him.  Sokolov, in 
coordination with the General Staff, produced what they believed was an impossible 
proposition: total nuclear disarmament within a fifteen-year timeframe.311 Apparently, 
Sokolov and the military leadership thought this would show the world that the Soviet 
Union wanted to eliminate nuclear weapons and therefore help it gain the moral high 
ground.  However, they also thought the idea would be rejected by the United States and 
thus would have no impact on negotiations.  In this way, they hoped to assuage 
Gorbachev while actually changing nothing.  Gorbachev happily endorsed the proposal 
and announced the initiative on January 16, 1986.  And, much to the military’s dismay, 
Reagan also was in favor of abolishing nuclear weapons. The military had fallen into its 
own trap. Having been the originators of the dramatic idea, they could hardly protest 
Gorbachev’s nuclear disarmament proposals once they were accepted by Reagan.312 
Nonetheless, the military and defense industries, still powerful actors, were 
probably behind Gorbachev’s decision to re-link SDI to an INF treaty at Reykjavík.  
Sokolov’s role may have been to gain Gorbachev’s agreement to keep the link between 
strategic defenses, INF, and strategic weapons agreements, in exchange for excluding 
British and French intermediate missiles in Europe from an INF treaty.313 
Regarding SDI, the early consensus among the Soviet leadership was that the 
United States was trying to “develop an impenetrable ABM shield capable of intercepting 
all the ballistic missiles targeted against the United States and its allies.”314 It was 
believed such a system was at least fifteen to twenty years away.  However, they also 
believed there was potential in the future for a ballistic missile defense that could 
intercept a large portion of incoming missiles. Therefore in the near term, a U.S. ballistic 
missile defense could be used to stop a weakened second strike from the Soviet Union.315  
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From the Soviets’ perspective, even the concept of “space-based weapons” 
undermined strategic stability by posing a threat to satellites that provided early-warning 
and command-and-control communications.  Furthermore, the strategic defense initiative 
presented a roadblock to arms reductions because a cheap way to counter SDI would be 
to build more strategic weapons. In light of these concerns, the Big Five “unanimously 
concurred” in 1985 that SDI was the number-one priority in negotiations with the United 
States, and they maintained this position throughout the discussions at Reykjavik.316    
More important, the Big Five devised a strategy to derail the U.S. initiative. In 
January 1986 Gorbachev had proposed on his own initiative a policy of non-withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty for fifteen years.317 In addition, based on recommendations from 
the Big Five, the Soviets proposed a ban on anti-satellite weapons and deployment of 
weapons in space in May 1986.318 And, in modified form, Gorbachev presented both 
proposals during the fall at Reykjavik. 
The power of the defense establishment fell suddenly on April 26, 1986, with the 
explosion of one of the four nuclear power plants at Chernobyl, killing at least eight 
thousand people and spreading nuclear fallout over Western Europe and the Ukraine.319 
The Chernobyl power plants were under the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) and 
the catastrophe revealed more than their incompetence.  As Gorbachev soon learned, they 
had hidden safety issues from the Politburo.320 And earlier in 1986, with perestroika 
stalled in the halls of his bureaucracies, Gorbachev had instituted glasnost, a term 
meaning “openness” and dating from the days of Alexander II when the government 
wanted to officially spur open constructive political debate.321 Glasnost made it 
impossible to hide the Chernobyl disaster from the Soviet people.322 Thus, the image of 
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the military was seriously tarnished and with it the old guard lost valuable political 
capital.  Chernobyl also left the military leadership deeply shaken, for it brought home 
what a nuclear war might really be.  To Marshall Akhromeyev, it revealed for the first 
time that there could be no victory in nuclear war.323 
Throughout the time period from March 1985 to November 1986, the scientific 
community engaged in missile defense related research.  In July 1985, the Central 
Committee approved “long-term research and development aimed at exploring the ways 
to create a multi-layered defense system with ground based and space-based 
elements.”324 The goal was to develop by 1995 the technical expertise to design and 
deploy a missile defense system.325  Research included, anti-satellite weapons, space 
based missile defenses, and lasers.326  Meanwhile, Soviet scientists also continued to 
develop countermeasures to SDI in conjunction with the defense industry.   
In addition, before Reykjavik, prominent scientists such as Roald Sagdeev and 
Yevgeny Velikhov counseled Gorbachev that SDI was not a short term or even medium 
term threat.327  By this time they did not believe it was physically possible to make a 
complete missile defense system and therefore saw no need for the Soviet Union to try 
and match the American defense initiative.  Moreover, these same scientists did not 
expect Gorbachev to make SDI a major issue at Reykjavik and were taken aback at the 
lost opportunity to make progress on intermediate and strategic nuclear force 
reductions.328 And to Sagdeev, Gorbachev’s insistence on confining SDI to laboratories 
also did not make much sense since the Soviet Union had in the past put laboratories in 
space; therefore it would be easy for the Americans to turn this against them.329  In fact, 
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at Shevardnadze’s behest, Sagdeev went public with his comments and was quoted as 
early as November 1986 in the American press on this issue.330   
However, they also worked as part of an international peace movement to end the 
arms race. Yevgeny Velikhov, vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, for 
example, used Gorbachev’s concern over the Strategic Defense Initiative to convince him 
that a nuclear test ban moratorium would be useful.  It would not only help the Soviets 
gain the moral high ground, but also, if the United States agreed to a moratorium it would 
hinder SDI’s development.331 
D. CONCLUSION 
Interestingly both the anti-SDI school and the thesis that SDI was a secondary 
factor in ending the Cold War are correct during this period.  The pro-SDI school fails 
because the defense initiative was not a primary factor driving Gorbachev’s foreign 
policy, though he was obsessed with stopping SDI.  In addition, it does not appear there 
was any immediate concern that Soviet research into missile defenses critically 
threatened the Soviet economy. 
Two key factors support the anti-SDI argument.  First, as noted, it appears the 
Soviets did not invest significant resources to develop either their own missile defense or 
extensive countermeasures during this time frame.  They did authorize a long-term 
research project, but did not dedicate significant resources to it.  Second, SDI was 
definitely an obstacle in the negotiations and extended the Cold War.  Had Reagan traded 
SDI away or Gorbachev de-linked it from his other agendas, the Cold War would most 
likely have ended at the Reykjavik summit.  And the reason Gorbachev maintained the 
linkage, despite Chernyaev’s and the scientists’ advice is probably, at least in part, 
because of an agreement Gorbachev worked out with the defense ministry.  Gorbachev 
had to balance the concerns of the Politburo or risk being deposed like Khrushchev, the 
last General Secretary who seriously tried to reform the system.   The domestic 
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bureaucratic politics surrounding SDI were certainly evident after Reykjavik when 
Shevardnadze asked Sagdeev to publicly undermine Gorbachev’s position on laboratories 
by noting the Soviets had put them in space in the past.  This was most likely a move by 
Shevardnadze to outflank the defense ministry’s position and to help him convince 
Gorbachev to abandon this argument.   
All of this begs an important question: would Gorbachev have pursued negotiations 
with Reagan even if there had never been a Strategic Defense Initiative?  While it is difficult 
to engage in counterfactuals, the answer in this instance is most certainly yes.  After all, 
Gorbachev had described the euromissiles as “a pistol to our head,” and would no doubt have 
attempted to reach an arms control agreement even if Reagan had never announced SDI.  
Thus, SDI created hurdles for Gorbachev not only in his own aims, but also in terms of 
convincing domestic partners to engage in meaningful negotiations and to enact perestroika.  
That said, it is also difficult to gauge what the bureaucrats’ resistance to negotiations would 
have been had there been no SDI.  For example, in the absence of SDI, one can imagine the 
defense industry maintaining their stiff insistence on the inclusion of British and French 
missiles in INF talks.  
Regardless, SDI did exist and though it extended the Cold War, it also motivated 
Gorbachev to engage in dialogue and reach an arms control treaty.  If he could not stop the 
U.S. initiative, he foresaw an arms race that would greatly increase the economic burden of 
the Soviet Union.  And he would not be able to reallocate resources to perestroika with an 
arms race fueled by SDI in high gear.  Also, as long as tensions were high, he could 
reasonably expect the United States to continue to hinder Soviet access to financial and 
technology transfers.  As he proclaimed to the Politburo, if the arms race continued, he 
expected the Soviets would lose.  This supports the thesis that Gorbachev perceived SDI as 
technological and economic threat the Soviet Union could not match.  Moreover, Gorbachev 
believed the Strategic Defense Initiative would continue to destabilize relations between the 
superpowers and might result in war.  To Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership, the initiative 
was an offensive weapons system that would encourage a first strike by the United States.  So 
SDI encouraged negotiation on many levels.  But as noted there were other factors such as 
the euromissiles and the underlying reason remained the economy which was weak enough to 
push Gorbachev towards negotiations regardless of SDI.     
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VI. EXITING THE COLD WAR: NOVEMBER 1986–DECEMBER 
1987 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Between November 1986 and December 1987 the Strategic Defense Initiative was 
a secondary factor driving the Soviet Union to exit the Cold War.  In February 1987, just 
four months after the stalemate at Reykjavik, Gorbachev removed the linkage between 
SDI and an INF treaty.  Though he and the Big Five still wanted to kill the defense 
initiative, Gorbachev needed the arms control agreement quickly to move forward with 
perestroika.  In part, one reason Gorbachev likely felt time was running out was the 
growing economic crisis, as his ill-fated anti-alcohol campaign and a precipitous drop in 
oil prices threatened to overwhelm the Soviet economy.  However, Gorbachev’s decision 
also reflected the view of his policy and scientific advisors that SDI was a long-term 
threat and a future U.S. administration would probably be more willing to negotiate it 
away.  In addition, in the spring of 1987, the military, a strong source of opposition to 
Gorbachev’s arms control efforts, was discredited when Mathias Rust landed his Cessna 
in Red Square, making it much easier for Gorbachev to implement policies.  Thus, on 
December 8, 1987, Gorbachev and Reagan signed the INF Treaty.  In addition to his 
previous concessions, Gorbachev relented on SDI and agreed to a global zero on 
intermediate missiles as well the inclusion of a global zero on Soviet land-based short-
range missiles.  Both sides also agreed to thorough verification of the treaty.   
B. GENERAL SECRETARY  
After Reykjavik Gorbachev was initially optimistic.  Though there was no 
agreement, he came away believing that one was possible in the near future, that he and 
Reagan had an understanding of what had to be done.332  He attributed Reagan’s 
attachment to SDI to his being a prisoner to the military-industrial complex and to his 
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desire to gain superiority over the Soviet Union.333  But some of Gorbachev’s reactions 
to the failed summit reflected a frustrated hardliner.  For example, for a time during the 
fall of 1986, Gorbachev apparently believed, despite the advice of Chernyaev and others, 
that the Soviet Union would develop its own missile defense system and that this would 
take the Americans by “surprise.”334 And in December 1986, he ordered the resumption 
of nuclear tests, thereby ending the Soviet’s eighteen-month unilateral moratorium.335 
During this time the United States had conducted twenty four tests, mostly in support of 
SDI, and Soviet representatives stated their own tests would resume unless America 
agreed to negotiate a complete ban on nuclear trials.336 By late February 1987 however, 
Gorbachev decided to remove limits on SDI as a precondition for INF talks in order to 
reach an arms agreement.  There appear to be three primary factors which influenced his 
decision. 
One was the economy. On October 30, 1986, he told the Politburo, “the 
[economic] situation has us all by the throat.”337 In April 1987, he stated that “Our 
financial position has reached the point of crisis,” a crisis that was exacerbated by two 
factors.  First, the anti-alcohol campaign begun in 1985 was an unmitigated disaster. 
Gorbachev hoped it would increase productivity, save the government money in terms of 
lost work hours, and help maintain order.338 When warned by both his finance minister 
and the first deputy of Gosplan that the campaign would result in revenue and budget 
shortfalls, Gorbachev declared, “We cannot tolerate our drunk budget any longer.”339 By 
the end of 1986 alcohol production had been severely cut and sales had fallen by almost 
forty percent, with a corresponding fall in much-needed revenues.340  In 1984, alcohol 
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revenues had accounted for 4.8 percent of the budget.  By 1986, it accounted for only 3.4 
percent and there was nothing to replace the loss.341  Moreover, products containing 
alcohol, from cologne to window-washing fluid, were flying off the shelves.  
Government supplies of sugar, a key ingredient in distilling alcohol, were plummeting.  
Rationing of basic goods was a very real possibility.342   
Even worse and beyond Gorbachev’s control was the crisis in oil, which for 
decades had been the keystone of the Soviet economy.  It brought in by far the most 
revenue and was the main source of hard currency, which was critical for buying 
grain.343  The Soviet Union had been the world’s largest grain importer since the 1960s, 
and without imported grain the USSR could not feed its people.344  As long as the price 
of oil remained high and the cost of extracting oil remained low, the Soviets were able to 
manage.  But in 1985, Saudi Arabia tripled its production and the price of oil plummeted: 
crude-oil prices fell from more than twenty-six dollars a barrel in 1985 to just over 
fourteen dollars in 1986.345 Soviet revenues also collapsed. In addition, the Soviets had 
not invested in technology and had over-used their wells to meet previous short-term 
needs. This meant that on top of the drop in prices, Soviet oil production was falling and 
the cost of extracting oil was rising.346  Finally, the Soviets were obligated to sell 
discounted oil to their satellites or risk greater instability in the empire.  
In short, the loss in revenues from the oil shock and the anti-alcohol campaign 
threatened the stability of the Soviet Union.  One way out might have been foreign loans, 
but with the Cold War still on and with Reagan in office there was little opportunity for 
foreign aid.347  Ending the Cold War was another solution, and it would also reduce 
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military costs.  As Abel Aganbegian, one of Gorbachev’s leading economic advisors, 
pointed out, “Naturally we are interested in disarmament, because then we can implement 
perestroika faster.”348 So in 1987 there was a strong, almost imperative, underlying 
economic incentive for Gorbachev to negotiate an end to the Cold War.  Yet another 
factor was the push by prominent Soviet scientists to promote the view that SDI was a 
long-term threat that the Soviet Union could postpone addressing.  This aspect will be 
discussed in detail later in the chapter.   
An event that was to prove very significant occurred on February 25, 1987.  
Alexander Yakovlev, a trusted foreign policy advisor, sent a memorandum to Gorbachev, 
reviewing a recent Moscow visit by the U.S. Foreign Relations Council.349 Among 
Yakovlev’s conclusions was the notion that the Reagan administration would never give 
up SDI, but if Gorbachev were to remove the linkage to SDI, an INF Treaty could be 
signed quickly.350 Yakovlev also noted that support for SDI in the United States was 
waning and that American hardliners were counting on the Soviets to stick to their 
package proposal to help save the defense initiative.  Therefore, to outmaneuver the 
Americans, Gorbachev should de-link SDI from the INF talks.  This would also result in 
better relations with Europe and China. And, in any case, it was unlikely that 
intermediate missiles would be needed to penetrate a U.S. missile defense system.  Thus, 
the SDI issue could be deferred and linked to future talks with a new administration that 
would probably be more willing to negotiate.351 Finally, though Yakovlev admitted it 
would appear Gorbachev was making a concession to the United States, the decision on 
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linkage needed to be made quickly so the Soviets could regain the initiative.352  In regard 
to START, Yakovlev recommended a fifty percent reduction in strategic forces.353  
The next day, Gorbachev and the Politburo agreed to untie the Reykjavik package 
and pursue a separate INF Treaty.  Gorbachev’s reasoning closely followed the Yakovlev 
memo.  At the meeting, Marshal Sokolov, the defense minister, agreed to break the 
linkage but noted that British and French missiles were already excluded from an INF 
agreement, perhaps a reminder to Gorbachev that in his view enough concessions had 
been made.354  On March 2, Gorbachev officially announced the decision to remove the 
link between an INF treaty and SDI.  However, he maintained that SDI would still be 
linked to a START agreement.  
Of course the conclusion of such an agreement….should be conditioned 
by a decision on preventing deployment of weapons in outer space, in 
view of the organic connection of these [offensive parity] issues.355   
Negotiations for an INF agreement with the United States moved quickly. In an 
April meeting with Secretary of State Schultz, Gorbachev agreed to include Soviet 
shorter-range missiles and expanded on the types of on-site verification that would be 
included in the treaty.  They also discussed strategic arms reductions, and here 
Gorbachev touched on SDI and expanded his definition of laboratory testing to include 
field testing but not space testing.356 So even with START, Gorbachev indicated he was 
willing to move past his Reykjavik position regarding SDI.  But this clarification could 
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also be seen as a move by Gorbachev to preemptively defeat any attempt by the United 
States to use Sagdeev’s argument that laboratories could be in space.     
Then in October, Secretary Shultz met with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze to go 
over the final plans for the Washington Summit and hit an unexpected bump over SDI.  
By this time, both sides had agreed that the Washington Summit would focus on signing 
an INF treaty but now Gorbachev called for an agenda that would also include strategic 
arms reductions (START), implying that an INF treaty would not be sufficient reason to 
hold a summit.357 And START was linked to the Soviet proposal that both sides agree to 
not withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a period of ten years, which in Gorbachev’s view 
meant no testing or deploying of weapons in space.358  So, again Gorbachev was 
apparently making an effort to contain SDI and essentially re-linking all three issues.  
Ambassador Jack Matlock and Pavel Palazchenko, Gorbachev’s interpreter, attribute 
Gorbachev’s evident backsliding to a Central Committee meeting only days before where 
Boris Yeltsin, a non-voting member of the Politburo, openly criticized Gorbachev for the 
lack of progress on perestroika and announced his decision to resign from the party 
leadership.359  This surprising turn of events put Gorbachev on shaky ground and, they 
argue, he feared that looking weak towards the Americans would bolster the 
conservatives in the party who were against any concessions and would somehow be able 
to use the Yelstin incident to their advantage.  In any case, Shevardnadze moved quickly 
to repair the damage and put the summit back on track.360  
Gorbachev and Reagan signed the INF treaty on December 8, 1987, fourteen 
months after the stalemate at Reykjavik.  Notably, it was the general secretary who made 
all the compromises, agreeing to even more than Reagan’s 1981 “zero option” proposal.  
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In what became known as the “double zero option,” the Soviet Union pledged to 
eliminate not only all intermediate range missiles but also all short-range intermediate 
missiles, of which the West had none.361 This was a reversal of the compromise reached 
at Reykjavik, where Reagan had agreed that the Soviets could keep one hundred 
intermediate missiles in Asia.  In the talks, Gorbachev refrained from discussing SDI, 
until Reagan mentioned his intention to move forward with research and possible 
deployment.  
Mr. President, you do what you have to do…. And if in the end you think 
you have a system you want to deploy, go ahead and deploy it. Who am I 
to tell you what to do? I think you’re wasting money…. We are moving in 
another direction, and we preserve our option to do what we think is 
necessary in our own national interest at the time.  And we think we can 
do it less expensively and with greater effectiveness.362  
But as noted, the Soviets did not discount SDI and the initiative would continue to 
be an obstacle in negotiating a START treaty, which was not accomplished until July 
1991.  Soviet negotiators were still trying to find a compromise on SDI when the empire 
dissolved later that year.363 
C. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMUNITY 
The defense community tacitly approved of Gorbachev’s decision to remove the 
linkage between SDI and an INF treaty.  But the defense minister, Sokolov, was against 
the concessions Gorbachev was making and fought constantly with Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze over the arms control negotiations.364  While Sokolov was unable to stop 
Gorbachev’s foreign policy, his views had to be accounted for.  For instance, 
Gorbachev’s decision in December 1986 to end the nuclear test moratorium was strongly 
influenced by the military and defense industry which argued that the Soviets might fall 
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behind in developing strategic technology if tests were not resumed.365  However, due to 
an unprecedented event that occurred on May 29, 1987, the defense community lost a 
great deal of political clout.  Mathias Rust, a West German teenager, piloted a single-
engine Cessna undetected from West Germany through Soviet air defenses and landed in 
Red Square.  The episode brought international embarrassment on the Soviet military, 
and Gorbachev used the incident to remove many of his domestic adversaries.  Sokolov 
and numerous generals and senior officers who had reservations about perestroika and 
Gorbachev’s “new thinking” were retired.  Marshal Akhromeyev remained: he had been 
supportive of Gorbachev’s efforts in the INF treaty because it would remove the threat of 
the Pershing II missiles.366  The new defense minister Gorbachev selected, Dimitri 
Yazov, was ignorant of the arms control talks, which gave Gorbachev more flexibility in 
negotiations.367   
While SDI was no longer linked to an INF treaty after February 1987, the 
members of the Big Five continued their efforts to stop the defense initiative. In June, 
they proposed an agreement to adhere to a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty for ten 
years, with testing conducted literally only in the laboratory and with a ban on any testing 
of missile defenses that could potentially be based in space.368  The agreement was 
approved by Gorbachev but rejected by the Americans who argued it would essentially 
add new provisions to the ABM Treaty.369 
The Big Five was generally supportive of the intermediate range missile reduction 
proposals in the months before the Washington Summit.370  But the representatives, 
especially from the Ministry of Defense and Military Industrial Commission, strongly 
objected to Gorbachev’s September concession to include shorter-range SS-23 missiles in 
the proposed INF Treaty.  They argued that the proposed treaty covered missiles whose 
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range was greater than 500 kilometers, while the SS-23’s range was only 400 kilometers. 
Therefore, the Big Five argued that the INF treaty should be adjusted to include all 
missiles whose range was greater than 400 kilometers, which would bring the American 
Lance 2 missiles into the agreement.  Gorbachev’s simply ignored their proposal.371 That 
he was able to do so with no repercussions is one indication that his domestic opponents 
no longer were a significant threat to his freedom of movement.  
During this period, Soviet scientists also influenced Gorbachev’s decision to 
remove the linkage between SDI and an arms control agreement.  First, to its own 
comparative advantage, the scientific community had by this time shifted its focus to 
inexpensive anti-satellite countermeasures that could destroy the space components of a 
SDI system if the United States ever put them in place.372  They offered the potential for 
a viable alternative to defeat SDI that would not demand too much from the Soviet 
economy and could give Gorbachev an opportunity to concede on SDI but maintain some 
of his domestic political support.   
Second, prominent scientists with access to Gorbachev continued to urge him to 
remove SDI as an obstacle to arms control.  In December 1986, Gorbachev allowed the 
physicist Andrei Sakharov to return from internal exile.  He had been banished in 1980 
for protesting Soviet human rights violations and the Afghan war.373  In a speech on 
February 15, 1987, at an international nuclear disarmament forum in Moscow, Sakharov 
pushed to break the linkage between the Strategic Defense Initiative and INF or START.  
If anything, he argued SDI was a long-term threat and should not deter arms reductions in 
the near term.374  According to Strobe Talbott, influenced by Sakharov, Roald Sagdeev 
and other leading Soviet scientists came to believe that they had “overestimated how 
much damage SDI could do to strategic stability in the short and even medium term.”375 
But Sagdeev had already given similar opinions to Gorbachev before Reykjavik.  More 
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likely, Sakharov’s comments reinforced Sagdeev’s beliefs and may have changed the 
opinion of other influential scientists such as Velikhov who according to Sakharov, 
argued privately in support of maintaining the linkage between SDI and an INF 
agreement.376  Certainly, Gorbachev’s statement to Reagan at Reykjavik echoed the 
opinion of his scientific advisers and Sakharov.377  However, the scientists remained 
concerned over SDI in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks.  For example, at the end of 
the Washington summit, Velikhov, vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, 
commented,  
Lets go for the 50% cut in strategic weapons. Don't test weapons in space 
for the period it takes to make these cuts, and by the end of the process, 
see what you want – more cuts or “Star Wars.” By then, most people in 
the world will prefer more cuts.378 
D. CONCLUSION 
In the signing of the INF Treaty in 1987, SDI was a secondary factor.  There is no 
evidence that SDI was a primary factor for Gorbachev to enter into negotiations during 
this time frame, instead it was one of many factors.  The economy was in turmoil but this 
was more because of the drop in oil prices and the anti-alcohol campaign, than any 
increase in defense spending to research means to defeat SDI.    
There is evidence to support the anti-SDI school in that the defense initiative 
remained a domestic political hurdle for Gorbachev.  The Rust affair checked the power 
of the defense community but the growing instability of the regime, exemplified by 
Yeltsin’s resignation, still made Gorbachev vulnerable to hard line conservatives.  But 
these difficulties did not prevent or prolong the signing of the INF Treaty in December. 
And this also can be seen as another reason to negotiate.  The sooner Gorbachev could 
declare peace with the United States the better able he would be to justify better relations 
with the West.   
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And if there was to be any hope of righting the economy and moving forward 
with perestroika, he would need Western technology, loans, and to reallocate defense 
resources to domestic needs.  All of these options would remain blocked as long as the 
Cold War continued: time was not on his side. The most viable way to end the conflict 
was through arms control and the best option remained an INF treaty.  But as Gorbachev 
had learned at Reykjavik, as long as the Soviets linked SDI to negotiations there would 
be no agreement while Reagan was in office.  Therefore, the obstacle of SDI had to be 
removed.  
By February 26, 1987, Gorbachev had decided it was in the Soviet interest to 
untie the Reykjavik package and remove the linkage between the Strategic Defense 
Initiative and the INF talks.  His argument to the Politburo to remove the linkage was that 
the Reagan administration, beholden as it was to the military industrial complex, wanted 
negotiations to fail.  Therefore, to outmaneuver them, the Soviets should de-link SDI at 
least from an INF agreement.  This is interesting because he was essentially arguing that 
in order to beat the Americans, the Soviet Union should accede to U.S. terms.   
The opinion of Soviet scientists regarding SDI also contributed to the change in 
direction.  They still considered SDI a threat in the long-term, but believed it was no 
longer a real threat in the near- or mid-term.  However, leaders in the Soviet scientific 
community had held this opinion before Reykjavik and had advised Gorbachev that SDI 
was not a real threat.  Therefore the difference in this time frame was the prominence of 
the scientists’ views which probably helped give Gorbachev the political room he needed 
to remove the linkage.  
In addition, over the coming months Gorbachev conceded again to American 
wishes, agreeing to include Soviet short-range missiles in the treaty.  In this decision, the 
diminished power of the defense bureaucracy was evident in that Gorbachev was simply 
able to disregard their protests.  Moreover, it also reflected Gorbachev’s desire to reach 
an agreement and reduce nuclear stockpiles.  However, as noted, Gorbachev was still 
under strong pressure from the conservatives in the communist party.  His brief 
backpedaling in the October meeting with Secretary Shultz shows that domestic politics 
was still a factor in foreign policy. 
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VII. ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF SDI IN THE END OF THE 
COLD WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examined three schools of thought on the role of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative in the end of the Cold War.  The two positions of the pro-SDI school are not 
supported by the available evidence.  The argument that the Soviet’s tried and failed to 
create either missile defense systems or effective countermeasures is clearly not true.  
Indeed, the USSR did not invest a crippling amount of resources into developing a Soviet 
SDI but instead, for the most part, bundled existing programs together into relatively 
inexpensive countermeasures.  The second position, that in light of SDI the Soviet 
leadership perceived they could never win an arms race and therefore sought 
negotiations, is to a degree correct.  However, since SDI was not a primary trigger but 
was instead one of many factors threatening the Soviet system this argument does not 
support the pro-SDI school.  The anti-SDI school is correct that the defense initiative 
often hindered negotiations and probably prolonged the conflict.  But, even though this is 
true, SDI was also one more strong reason for the Soviet Union to negotiate with the 
United States and in the end may have contributed to a more comprehensive arms 
agreement.  Finally, the anti-SDI school argument that Soviet economy was not 
threatened by SDI may or may not be correct but it is clear that Gorbachev perceived SDI 
would mean an arms race in space that would ruin the economy.  Therefore, this anti-SDI 
argument is not accurate.  The case that SDI was a secondary factor is best supported by 
the available evidence. SDI highlighted the Soviet Union’s economic and technological 
backwardness relative to the West but was one of many pressures on the declining Soviet 
empire that influenced Gorbachev’s ability and desire to exit the Cold War.   
B. THE PRO-SDI SCHOOL 
The pro SDI school, that argues SDI was a primary factor in ending the Cold War, 
is based on two lines of thought, neither of which is supported by the available evidence.  
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One, the position that the Soviets tried and failed to make their own missile defense 
system and that this drove them to exit the Cold War, is clearly incorrect.  In 1985, the 
Soviets launched an in depth research program to develop the technical capabilities to 
make and deploy a missile defense system by 1995, should it be required.  But their own 
research helped convince the scientists that a complete missile defense shield was not 
feasible with the available technology, at least not in the near or mid term.  By early 
1987, they also came to believe that even practicable partial defenses could not be 
deployed in the mid term.  In fact, by the time of the Reykjavik summit, prominent 
scientists such as Roald Sagdeev were discounting the threat of SDI.  So while Soviet 
scientists did fail to develop an effective missile defense system, this brought them, by 
late 1986 to early 1987, to discount the ability of the Americans to do the same. Their 
concern over SDI also diminished because they found relatively cheap countermeasures 
were an effective alternative.  Therefore, in order for this argument to be correct, 
Gorbachev would have to have believed the Americans were able to do something his 
scientific advisors said was impossible.  Gorbachev’s decision to maintain the linkage 
between SDI and nuclear arms reductions at the Reykjavik Summit superficially supports 
this thesis.  But in reality, Gorbachev’s reasons for keeping the linkage seems to be the 
result of choosing the more conservative advice of his scientific advisors and of 
bureaucratic bargaining with the ministry of defense.  His decision to remove the linkage 
in February 1987 was not a result of the belief that SDI was an unmatchable threat but 
instead reflected, in part, the belief that SDI should not be treated as an immediate 
concern.  Finally, at no time does it appear that the Soviet Union invested significant 
additional resources in this research project.  That is, many of the programs they 
investigated had already existed in some form before the announcement of SDI, and 
while the additional resources dedicated to researching countermeasures or missile 
defense systems did add some burden to the economy, its impact was minimal.  
The second argument that SDI highlighted the economic and technical 
backwardness of the Soviet Union and thus convinced them they could not afford to 
compete with the United States is more ambiguous.  In a sense it is true, as Gorbachev 
flatly told to the Politburo in January 1986, that the main goal was to avoid an arms race 
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in space because the Soviets would lose it.379  But for the pro-SDI school to be correct 
the Strategic Defense Initiative would have to have been the primary factor for the 
Soviets to enter into arms control negotiations with the United States and for Gorbachev 
to sign the INF Treaty.  It is here that this position of the pro-SDI school falls short.   
First, beginning in the Carter administration, influential Soviet leaders like Yuri 
Andropov began to believe the correlation of forces was moving against the USSR.  In 
1981, Andropov initiated operation RYAN to gather information on the purported 
American plans for a surprise attack.  This level of paranoia, that probably reflected the 
stain of Hitler’s surprise invasion in 1941, continued to increase with the euromissile 
issue and Reagan’s military buildup.  The president’s announcement of SDI sent it to a 
fever pitch.  But the point is Andropov was already significantly alarmed without SDI.   
A year later, the decision to resume negotiations was not driven entirely by SDI, 
though Gorbachev was appreciably alarmed by the American initiative and insisted it be 
tied to the reduction of intermediate and strategic weapons.  But, SDI was not a primary 
factor in seeking negotiations and a drawback from the Cold War, there were multiple 
reasons to negotiate in the absence of SDI.  And this is a key point, as we have seen had 
SDI never been announced it is still very likely that Gorbachev would have sought 
negotiations and a reprieve from the Cold War.   Therefore SDI was neither a necessary 
nor sufficient as a single factor for ending the conflict.  
C. THE ANTI-SDI SCHOOL 
The anti-SDI school is correct that SDI added another layer to negotiations and in 
that sense prolonged the Cold War.  In the fall of 1983, SDI was probably one more 
reason, on top of the euromissiles, to walk out on the INF and START negotiations.  And 
SDI was probably also a factor in the Soviet decision to avoid negotiations until after 
Reagan’s reelection.  The defense initiative reinforced Soviet beliefs that Reagan was 
“unpredictable,” and not serious about negotiations, and they therefore did not want to 
hand him a “victory’ by agreeing to talks before the November elections.  
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At the Geneva and especially the Reykjavik summit, SDI was a roadblock to 
reaching the INF and START treaties.  At Reykjavik, had Reagan agreed to trade the 
Strategic Defense Initiative away in exchange for the significant nuclear arms reductions 
Gorbachev offered, or had Gorbachev agreed to de-link SDI from INF and START, the 
Cold War would probably have ended in October  1986.  And the anti-SDI school is also 
correct that domestic politics played a role in maintaining the linkage.  Both Chernyaev 
and scientists such as Roald Sagdeev told Gorbachev that SDI was not a threat and 
Chernyaev recommended removing the linkage.  Gorbachev may not have done this in 
part because he had made an agreement with the ministry of defense to maintain the 
linkage in order to gain their support to remove British and French intermediate forces 
from the Soviet position. 
The anti-SDI school falls short though in its argument that SDI did not threaten 
the Soviet economy.  It may very well be true that technically the Soviet economy had 
the capacity maintain an incremental increase in defense spending.  But the perception by 
key decision makers, most importantly Gorbachev, was that the economy could not 
afford to favor defense anymore than it was and that in fact a reduction in defense 
spending was imperative.  Gorbachev was adamant in his belief that an arms race in 
space would break the Soviet economy and ruin perestroika.  
D. SDI WAS A SECONDARY FACTOR 
The evidence best supports the thesis that the Strategic Defense Initiative was one 
of many factors which helped end the Cold War.  As a tool of U.S. foreign policy, it was 
an important but not primary lever used by the Reagan administration to try and shape 
Soviet behavior.  For example, as outlined in National Security Decision Directive 75, the 
administration also moved to counter the Soviet Union in the Third World, dramatically 
increased the size of American conventional forces, and linked human rights to 
negotiations and tied trade directly to human rights.  In addition, the United States tried to 




to the USSR, and helped convince the Saudis to drop the price of oil.  For Reagan, SDI 
was also part of his personal dream to make nuclear missiles obsolete and to provide a 
real defense for his country.   
The initial Soviet reactions from March 1983 to March 1985 also support the 
thesis that SDI was a secondary factor in ending the Cold War.  The gravest concern for 
Soviet leaders in 1983 seemed to be the euromissiles but SDI, along with all the other 
American efforts were also factors.  After Reagan’s reelection, Gorbachev, leading the 
Politburo in Chernenko’s absence, along with scientists, and the Big Five accepted that 
concerted dialogue was the best option to solve the euromissiles issue, negotiate strategic 
weapons reductions, and defeat SDI.   
During the period from March 1985 to October 1986, the defense initiative 
remained a secondary factor.  Gorbachev’s main concern when he became general 
secretary in March 1985 was to improve the Soviet economy to catch up to the West and 
to improve the lives of Soviet citizens.  As general secretary, Gorbachev believed he had 
to “create favorable external conditions,” to successfully engage in perestroika, thus 
Soviet foreign policy was closely tied to domestic reform.380  Gorbachev apparently 
believed the best way to reduce the defense burden would be to defuse tensions with the 
United States which would help him outflank domestic bureaucrats who justified their 
defense budgets by pointing to the American threat.  Better relations with the West could 
also allow more access to financial and technological transfers that could help revive the 
Soviet economy.   And unlike the multiple bureaucracies that were involved in managing 
the economy, relations with the West were dominated only by the foreign and defense 
ministries so Gorbachev could more quickly implement his polices in this area.  
Therefore the state of the Soviet economy and American posturing even without SDI 
would probably have been enough to persuade Gorbachev to negotiate with the United 
States and exit the Cold War.  However, the existence of the defense initiative added 
another important reason to engage in dialogue with the United States.  Gorbachev and  
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the Soviet leadership initially saw SDI as an offensive weapons system that would 
encourage a first strike by the United States and therefore it was inherently destabilizing 
and needed to be stopped.  
By the time of the Reykjavik Summit in the fall of 1986, SDI was a strong reason 
to negotiate.  Gorbachev may have seen the defense initiative as a real technological and 
economic challenge the Soviet Union could not match and therefore he felt he had to 
somehow defeat it at the Reykjavik Summit. He was probably advised by some in the 
scientific community such as Velikhov to maintain the linkage between SDI and 
intermediate range nuclear forces.  This is an extrapolation but since as late as February 
1987 Velikhov was privately defending the linkage to Sakharov, one can expect that he 
was supporting it before the Reykjavik summit.  This could explain why Gorbachev 
ignored Chernyaev’s advice to remove the linkage between SDI and intermediate range 
nuclear forces talks and disregarded Sagdeev’s assessment that SDI was, at best, a long 
term threat.  Gorbachev’s position may also have been influenced by a bargain he made 
with the defense industry to maintain the linkage in exchange for their support to drop 
British and French missiles from INF negotiations.  In this case Gorbachev may have 
feared that unless he defeated SDI via negotiations, his military industrial complex would 
use SDI as a means to justify increased military spending.  At the very least SDI would 
make it difficult for Gorbachev to reduce defense spending which he saw as critical to 
perestroika.  But as noted there were other factors, such as the euromissiles and the weak 
economy. 
Why Gorbachev changed his position on the linkage of SDI only four months 
later is up for debate.  One factor was the change of heart of the majority of the scientific 
community which apparently happened at a nuclear disarmament forum in February 
1987.  But as we have seen, Roald Sagdeev, an influential Soviet scientist, had told 
Gorbachev before Reykjavik that SDI was not an immediate threat.  Another factor was 
the realization, as outlined in Yakovlev’s February 25 memo to Gorbachev, that the 
Reagan administration would not give in on SDI.   A third factor was the rapidly 
deteriorating economic situation.  The confluence of these events may have convinced 
Gorbachev that SDI was no longer a near term threat, or made him feel he now had the 
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political power to remove the linkage.  Perhaps the economy was collapsing around him 
and he felt he had to reach an agreement quickly, declare the Cold War over, and focus 
on perestroika. Whatever the reason, after February 1987, SDI became linked only to 
START.  What is important to note is SDI remained a reason to negotiate an end to the 
Cold War but was not the only or most important factor.   
The question is if the positions of both the anti-SDI school and the SDI as a 
secondary factor schools offer valid arguments than who is really “right?”  Overall, the 
secondary factor school is most correct.  First, while SDI did complicate negotiations, it 
was also a secondary factor driving Soviet leaders to negotiate.  Gorbachev was wary of 
the perceived strategic instability a missile defense system would cause and he shared 
Reagan’s goal of decreasing tensions and avoiding nuclear war.  Gorbachev also believed 
the USSR would lose the technological and economic competition involved in a new 
arms race in space.  In addition, he wanted to negotiate SDI away to help him overcome 
domestic opponents that resisted his efforts to decrease the defense burden.  Therefore, 
SDI was a positive factor in that it was one more reason, sometimes a very important 
reason, for Gorbachev to negotiate with the United States.   In addition, while SDI may 
have delayed the end of the Cold War by fourteen months it also then allowed for a more 
comprehensive treaty.  The INF Treaty signed at the Washington Summit included a 
global zero of intermediate missiles vice the tentative agreement at Reykjavik which 
would have allowed for one hundred Soviet missiles in Asia to remain.  In addition, the 
Soviet Union also agreed to eliminate its shorter range nuclear missiles by the time of the 
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